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There is a moment, a lacuna,I that hangs in space and time.
Faced with it, an individual records sensations and events, organ-
izes and categorizes phenomena, assigns meaning. In that mo-
ment, abhorring a vacuum, we rush to fill the void, to shape and to
take control of our world. If we are naive, we reify that which we
construct.
In this Article, we will stalk lacunae. We will see that com-
munication, to the extent it takes place, rests on assignment of
meaning colored instantaneously by the contextually triggered
self, the selection of words and the framing of cognitions. Part II of
this Article explores the mechanics of this phenomenon, focusing
on theories of self, language, cognition and hermeneutics. Part III
examines its operation in social relations, using as examples two
recent bodies of legal scholarship--critical white studies and inter-
sectionality/anti-essentialism theory-and two cases that were
pending before the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1997 Term: Tax-
man v. Board of Education of Piscataway2 (now settled) and Miller
v. Christopher.3 Finally, Part IV addresses ramifications for juris-
prudence and, specifically, for the judicial role.
* J.D., University of Connecticut, 1998; Editor-in-Chief, Connecticut Law
Review, 1997-98. I dedicate this Article to the memory of my father, Joseph Ed-
ward O'Connor, whose keen intellect, ready wit, and love of language remain my
deepest inspiration.
1. A lacuna is "[a]n empty space or a missing part; a gap." AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1006 (3d ed. 1996).
2. 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1551 (1997), cert. dis-
missed, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997).
3. 96 F.3d 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1551 (1997), cert.
limited, 117 S. Ct. 1689 (1997).
Law and Inequality
II. Get It?
One can never really answer this question in the affirmative
with complete assurance. One could hardly function, however, if
one sat around waiting for communicative closure. So we settle for
near misses, for exhibitions of expected reactions; we interpret the
rejoinders received. It is a complex, charming, kaleidoscopic en-
terprise and, in a reductive sense, the only real entertainment
around. How do we do it?
A. Multiple Selves: Who's in Charge Now?
With the advent of postmodernism, complexity has become
the order of the day. Discontented with unitary, essentialist depic-
tions of race, gender, and other identity categories, postmodernists
confront and validate fragmentation and contradiction.4 Some
theorists are now suggesting that the core of our identity-the
self-is far less integrated and seamless than we imagine. 5
Professor powell, for example, asserts that we are not each
unitary, stable selves, one self to one body; rather, we are each
comprised of multiple selves that shift and change in response to
stimuli. 6 Indeed, "given the shifting crossroads each individual
experiences . .. the self is constructed by a 'multiplicity of fluid
identities defined and acting situationally."'7 This is a radical no-
tion, given our cultural adherence to rationalism.8 Even the terms
"individual," "self," "person," "I," "you," always applied in the sin-
gular to "one" human, demonstrate the deep attachment to the
one-body/one-self paradigm.
4. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal The.
ory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 615 (1990) (arguing that we must recognize differences
between women to strengthen the feminist movement).
5. See, e.g., Trina Grillo, Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to
Dismantle the Master's House, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 16, 20 (1995) (writing
about the "multiple voices" with which we speak); Berta Esperanza Hernandez-
Truyol, Borders (En)genderedi Normativities, Latinas, and a Latcrit Paradigm, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 882, 925 (1997) (describing the multidimensional identity of
latina/os); john a. powell, The Multiple Self- Exploring Between and Beyond Mod-
ernity and Postmodernity, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1481, 1483-84 (1997) (describing iden-
tity as fragmented and decentered).
6. See powell, supra note 5, at 1483-84.
7. Id. at 1497 (citing Susan Stanford Friedman, Beyond White and Other: Ra-
tionality and Narratives of Race in Feminist Discourse, in SIGNS 1, 7 (1995)).
8. I use the term "rationalism" here to describe the cognitive framework that
places ego-centered reason at the helm. See Pierre Schlag, Missing Pieces: A Cog-
nitive Approach to Law, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1197 n.7 (1989) [hereinafter Schlag,
Missing Pieces].
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Yet the multiple-self concept seems intuitively right. Begin
by listening to the narratives of African-Americans who recount
experiencing different identities when in the company of African-
Americans than of whites.9 Then recall the different selves you
have been. In another time, I was devoted to music and art. My
dress, language, values, friends and taste were different than they
are today. On occasion, when I am triggered by particularly good
music or a riveting painting, that self resurfaces. She suddenly
wants to ditch the tweeds and pull the funky black dress from the
back of the closet. Then I walk into a law school classroom, and
she submerges.
Old selves return like old friends, triggered by smell, by
neighborhoods, by the senses, even by a particularly strong mem-
ory. If they were really gone, displaced by the current unitary self,
how could they resurface so easily? I believe they linger under the
surface, waiting to appear when bidden, perhaps only as a trace of
fleeting nostalgia, but they are there. It is probably only because I
am white that I am aware of my various selves in an exclusively
linear, temporal fashion. If I were a person of color, I might, for
example, feel the need to conform to white norms in the workplace,
and feel free to relax into another self when at home. The regular
moving in and out of various selves within the course of one day
heightens awareness of the postmodernist conception of the self.10
But is it only the behavior that alters, behavior consciously
chosen by the unitary self? For a moment that seems more likely;
the lockstep of the rationalist paradigm is seductive. But surely,
on reflection, the sensation of another self surfacing is more than
9. See, e.g., Judy Scales-Trent, Notes of a White Black Woman, in CRITICAL
WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR 475, 478-81 (Richard Delgado &
Jean Stefancic eds., 1997) [hereinafter CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES] (relating stories
of people whose identities changed as they moved from one culture or role to an-
other); Gregory Williams, Learning How to Be Niggers, in CRITICAL WHITE
STUDIES, supra, at 458-66 (telling the author's story of learning as a boy that he
was part African-American and of experiencing different identities); powell, supra
note 5, at 1491-92 (describing African-Americans whose sense of identity changed
with the racial context). I join Barbara Flagg here in defining "white" as a person
of "European descent who ... has no known trace of African or other non-
European ancestry." Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See'" White Race
Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MCH. L. REV.
953, 953 n.1 (1993) [hereinafter Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I Sed'].
10. Despite my assertion of multiple selves, now I must lapse into the singular
to communicate within the conventions of English. The way language shapes our




behavior; it is emotion, impulse; it need not be acted on. Some-.
times one stands still when it happens, overcome.11
So if, indeed, we are "a welter of partial, sometimes contra-
dictory, or even antithetical selves," 12 how have we, as a culture,
come to accept the unitary self as the "prior" for all subsequent
computations? 13 Given that white heterosexual Christian males
have been culturally accepted regardless of what context they oc-
cupied, the sense of moving in and out of selves must have been
infrequent for them, leading them to postulate the unitary self.14
Language evolved to support and re-create that conception.' 5 And
in true Cartesian either/or, right/wrong form, the concept of multi-
ple selves in one personality became confined to the context of a
psychological disorder.' 6 Indeed, at the outset of the discussion,
the reader may have initially conflated multiple personality disor-
der (now known as dissociative identity disorder) with the exis-
tence of multiple selves. I did. One could see such resistance as
further evidence of the tenacity of the rationalist paradigm, fueled
by the discomfort of accepting the postmodernist vision of the
world as complex, replete with tensions, contradictions and gen-
eral untidiness.
B. The Language: "Taming the Wild Profusion of Existing
Things"
Few things delight more than reading Foucault's description
of "animals" as defined in a Chinese encyclopedia:
11. See Scales-Trent, supra note 9, at 479 ("Sometimes you can change identi-
ties while you are doing absolutely nothing at all.").
12. Harris, supra note 4, at 584.
13. See Robert Birmingham, Proving Miracles and the First Amendment, 5
GEO. MASON L. REV. 45, 51, 68-69 (1996) ("Prior probabilities [in the context of
Bayes Theorem] notoriously lack sufficient justification. We have no basis, other
than the principle of indifference, to assign one value rather than another.");
Wayne Eastman, Ideology and Formality: The Eternal Golden Snarl, 29 CONN. L.
REV. 849, 865 (1997) ("Bayesian priors are entangled with ideology .... "); see also
Thomas D. Lyon & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Relevance Ratio: Evaluating the Pro-
bative Value of Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
48-49 (1996) (stating that "much ... debate has concerned the feasibility of identi-
fying prior[s]"). Bayes Theorem is a mathematical theory of probability which uses
prior probabilities (priors) in determining the probability of an event's occurrence.
See Lyon & Koehler, supra, at 49.
14. See powell, supra note 5, at 1487-90, 1493.
15. As powell puts it, "[t]he unitary self is an illusion that the dominant White
male is able to maintain because of his central situating in modern discourse."
powell, supra note 5, at 1492 n.49; see infra notes 17-33 and accompanying text
(discussing how language shapes our views of the world).
16. See DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-IV)
484-87 (Am. Psychiatric Ass'n 1994).
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This book first arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the
laughter that shattered, as I read the passage, all the familiar
landmarks of my thought--our thought, the thought that
bears the stamp of our age and our geography-breaking up
all the ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we are
accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing things, and
continuing long afterwards to disturb and threaten with col-
lapse our age-old distinction between the Same and the Other.
This passage quotes a "certain Chinese encyclopaedia" in
which it is written that "animals are divided into: (a) belong-
ing to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs,
(e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the pres-
ent classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with
a very fine camelhair brush, (1) et cetera, (in) having just bro-
ken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like
flies." In the wonderment of this taxonomy, the thing we ap-
prehend in one great leap, the thing that ... is demonstrated
as the exotic charm of another system of thought, is the limi-
tation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking that. 17
This passage highlights the contingency of categories em-
ployed across cultures and across time. The more parochial the
reader, the more she experiences the categorization imposed upon
the world's ddsordre by her language as implacable, impenetrable,
beyond cavil. Indeed, "the most alienated and uncomprehending
relationship one can have with a language is usually the one na-
tive speakers have with their own."' 8 The structural grid of the
mother tongue slices, dices and synthesizes the natural world for
our consumption lest we be overwhelmed by the cascade of sensa-
tions that is life. In our most illiberal moments, we imagine that
the grid itself is neutral, that we ourselves are "impartial recorders
of [our] world."'19
But language serves two functions-intake and outflow. The
outflow function serves to communicate our concepts to another;
we are generally aware of this on a conscious level. The intake
function "is itself the shaper of ideas, the program and guide
for the individual's mental activity, for his analysis of
impressions."20 Theorists assert that language thus embraces the
power to determine what is considered normal and abnormal in a
culture. 21 Whorfs "linguistic relativity principle" postulated that
17. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS xv (Vintage Books 1973) (1970).
18. Richard Hyland, Babel: A She'ur, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1585, 1607 (1990).
19. Dale Spender, Extracts from Man Made Language, in THE FEMINIST
CRITIQUE OF LANGUAGE 102, 103 (Deborah Cameron ed., 1990).
20. BENJAMIN LEE WHORF, Science and Linguistics, in LANGUAGE, THOUGHT,
AND REALITY 207, 212 (John B. Carroll ed., 1956).




"users of markedly different grammars are pointed by their gram-
mars toward different types of observations and different evalua-
tions of externally similar acts of observation, and hence are not
equivalent as observers but must arrive at somewhat different
views of the world."22 Absent expansion of experience that would
throw the provincial nature of our conceptions into bold relief, we
regard our view of the world as uncontestable, as a "transparent"
23
baseline, as "part of the background of experience of which we tend
to remain unconscious."24 By way of example, Whorf discusses a
hypothetical people who could only see in shades of blue, noting
that their language would contain no color terms.25
And so, "every language is a vast pattern-system, different
from others, in which are culturally ordained the forms and cate-
gories by which the personality not only communicates, but also
analyzes nature, notices or neglects types of relationship and phe-
nomena, channels his reasoning, and builds the house of his con-
sciousness." 26 And because such pattern-systems inhere in the de-
22. BENJAMIN LEE WHORF, Linguistics as an Exact Science, in LANGUAGE,
THOUGHT, AND REALITY, supra note 20, at 220, 221; see also WILLARD VAN ORMAN
QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT 51-53 (1960) (asserting the inscrutability of reference).
The Sapir/Whorfian Hypothesis, as it is sometimes called, has adherents and crit-
ics. For a nonbeliever's critique, see STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT 57-
63 (1994). Others qualify the hypothesis, stating that "[languages differ not so
much as to what can be said in them, but rather as to what is relatively easy to
say." Charles F. Hocket, Chinese versus English: An Exploration of the Whorfian
Theses, in LANGUAGE IN CULTURE 106, 122 (Harry Hoijer ed., 1954), cited in Rich-
ard Hyland, A Defense of Legal Writing, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 599, 606 n.52 (1986).
But Whorf is readily cited by believers in the legal academy for the proposition
that "language ... structure[s] our perceptions of reality." See, e.g., J.M. Balkin,
Ideology as Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1151 n.72 (1991) (book review)
(citing WHORF, supra note 20).
23. See infra note 117 and accompanying text (defining transparency).
24. WHORF, supra note 20, at 209. For a vastly entertaining and effective
demonstration of the lack of gender neutrality in English, see William Satire (alias
Douglas Hofstadter), A person paper on purity in language, in THE FEMINIST
CRITIQUE OF LANGUAGE, supra note 19, at 187.
25. See WHORF, supra note 20, at 209.
26. BENJAMIN LEE WHORF, Language, Mind, and Reality, in LANGUAGE,
THOUGHT, AND REALITY, supra note 20, at 246, 252. Dale Spender relayed an illus-
tration of this phenomenon as follows:
In many.., experiments Witkin and his colleagues found that females
were more likely to see the stimulus and surrounding field as a whole
while males were more likely to separate the stimulus from its context.
Witkin of course was obliged to name this phenomenon and he did so
in accordance with the principles already encoded in the language. He
took the existing patterns of male as positive and female as negative, and
objectively devised his labels. He named the behaviour of males as field
independence, thereby perpetuating and strengthening the image of male
supremacy; he named the female behaviour as field dependence and
thereby perpetuated and strengthened the image of female inferiority.
[Vol. 16:493
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sire to escape chaos, their structure is replete with categorizations
and bipolar oppositions (good/evil, friend/foe, right/wrong,
male/female, white/black, sick/healthy, individual/collective, sub-
ject/object, normal/abnormal, positive/negative). 27 That amputa-
tions must take place in order to jam phenomena into one or an-
other category is the cost of doing business for the human psyche. 28
Deconstructionists have encouraged us to fight the imperious urge
of schemata abstraction, advising us instead to collapse binary op-
positions to reveal the authentic, if tension-laden, natural world-
the world of events and phenomena as they exist outside the realm
of our own limited perception.29 We fight this, of course; some
scholars believe we were built to fight it, that the survival of the
prehistoric human turned, in large part, on her ability to catego-
rize. 30
So we have seen that differences between cultures are inex-
tricably linked to their language-implicating both the functions of
intake and outflow. This cross-cultural contingency is amplified by
the postmodern view of "New Historicism," which asserts that the
image of a unified, coherent culture is as mythical as the inde-
.... There is nothing inherently dependent or independent in seeing
something as a whole, or dividing it into parts. Witkin has coined names
which are consistent with the patriarchal order and in the process he has
extended and reinforced that order.
There are alternatives. With my particular bias I could well have
named this same behaviour as positive for females and negative for males.
I could have described the female response as context awareness and the
male response as context blindness, and though these names would be just
as valid ... they would no doubt have been seen as political precisely be-
cause they do not adhere to the strict (sexist) rules by which the names of
our language have traditionally been coined.
Spender, supra note 19, at 108-09.
27. See Heiner Flohr, Biological Bases of Social Prejudices, in THE SOCIO-
BIOLOGY OF ETHNOCENTRISM: EVOLUTIONARY DIMENSIONS OF XENOPHOBIA,
DISCRIMINATION, RACISM, AND NATIONALISM 190, 195 (Vernon Reynolds et al. eds.,
1987) (1986); J. M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L. J.
743, 748 (1987) [hereinafter Deconstructive Practicel; Hyland, supra note 18, at
1608.
28. See JOHN R. ANDERSON, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 158
(1980). As Lawrence puts it, "we must categorize in order to cope." Charles R.
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protectiow Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 337 (1987).
29. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 27, at 743 (citing JACQUES DERRIDA, DIS-
SEMINATION (B. Johnson trans., 1981); JACQUES DERRIDA, MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY
(1982); JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (1976); JACQUES DERRIDA, PO-
SITIONS (1981); JACQUES DERRIDA, SPEECH AND PHENOMENA (1973); JACQUES
DERRIDA, SPURS (1979); JACQUES DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE (1978)); infra
note 71 and accompanying text (quoting Gary Peller's description of how social
conventions of representing the word are presented as factual rather than provi-
sional).
30. See Flohr, supra note 27, at 190, 195.
1998]
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pendent, language-free formation of concepts.31 All cultures are
composed of "groups [that] struggle for discursive power just as
they struggle for political dominance"; "multiple, conflicting,
polyphonous contexts" are the rule rather than the exception.3 2
That this hypothesis would resonate with Americans seems obvi-
ous; subcultures abound, each with different slang, different val-
ues, different socioeconomic realities and opportunities. Linguistic
relativity may exist within the confines of a single country and
even a single language. 33
C. Cognition: Dissonance and Dichotomies
1. A Taxonomy
The dissonance that exists between cognitive frameworks is
not limited to that caused by differing linguistic structures. It is a
commonplace that authors draft manuscripts steeped in vastly
disparate perspectives despite a shared language. Pierre Schlag
has schematized such perspectives as follows:
Prerationalism asks no questions and takes things as given. It is
extremely secure in its understanding of the world; it does not al-
low the internal intellectual distance that would permit self-
reflection. Rationalism is cognitively upsetting, because it con-
stantly calls the world into question and asks for the redemption
and justification of descriptive and normative claims. Modernism
pushes the critical edge even further and puts reason on trial.
Modernism constantly strives to articulate in polite, theoretical
terms the unpresentable underside of reason. Postmodernism
continues the modernist project, but drops the polite, theoretical
conversation. 34
Specifically, prerationalism evinces unquestioning obedience
to a sacred text, tradition or convention. 35 Such texts are perme-
ated with demands for return to whatever authority has been can-
31. See William W. Fisher, III, Texts and Contexts: The Application to Ameri-
can Legal History of the Methodologies of Intellectual History, 49 STAN. L. REV.
1065, 1072 (1997).
32. Id.
33. The recent controversy regarding the teaching of Ebonics (Black English) is
illustrative. See Charles Smith, Racism and Community Planning: Building Eq-
uity or Waiting for Explosions, 8 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 61, 61 (1997). Linguists
Robert C. Williams and Dr. Geneva Smitherman assert that Ebonics is "a legiti-
mate language system featuring highly complex grammar and syntax that can be
identified as originating from Africa and the Caribbean." Mary Maxwell Thomas,
The African American Male: Communication Gap Converts Justice into "Just Us"
System, 13 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 1, 11 n.58 (1997).
34. Schlag, Missing Pieces, supra note 8, at 1208.
35. See id. at 1209.
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onized: the intent of the framers, established customs or the com-
mon-law method of reasoning.36  'Creativity' is a dirty word";
things are accepted as given with no questions asked.3 7
Rationalism, ruler of the legal realm, rests on ego-centered
reason.38 The individual self, privileged as objective and neutral,
searches for abstract universals and adjudicates normative in-
quiries. 39 "As long as the self has proper training, makes no intel-
lectual errors, and tries its damnedest to overcome its own preju-
dices and environmental bias, it is intellectually authorized to
adjudicate normative legal questions on its own."40 Any attempt to
dethrone the individual self as the ultimate arbiter of reality is
fiercely resisted. 41 Adherents to the rationalist framework exhibit
an addiction to normative recommendations spawned by an un-
flappable belief that reason governs and that the best argument
always wins.42
The voice of modernism, critiquing the circularity of ration-
alism, is found in legal realism, critical legal studies and feminist
jurisprudence. 43 Modernism's impeachment of detached, ego-
centered reason rests on the revelation that initial entitlements
and foundational concepts, such as property and due process, are
not neutral, objective, logically compelled baselines; rather, they
are the fruits of institutional privileging. 44 And so, "modernists...
adopt the universalizing tendency of rationalists but ... carry it
even further so as to decenter the self and its particular cognitive
framework."46 This universalizing tendency implicitly continues
the rationalist project of searching for abstract universals and con-
36. See id. at 1210, 1241.
37. Id. at 1210.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 1213.
40. Id.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 1211.
43. See id. at 1216.
44. See id. at 1216 n.4; see also Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a
Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SC. Q. 470, 478-79, 493 (1923) (The
channels into which industry shall flow, then, as well as the apportionment of the
community's wealth, depend upon coercive arrangements .... The arrangements
are susceptible of great alternation by governmental bodies .... ); Felix Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809,
815-17 (1935) ("The vicious circle inherent in this reasoning is plain. It purports to
base legal protection upon economic value, when, as a matter of actual fact, the
economic value of a sales device depends upon the extent to which it will be legally
protected.").




Finally, postmodernism perseveres in the modernist enter-
prise but abandons even the facade of universalism, seeking in-
stead to highlight ruptures and to focus on "difference, discontinu-
ity, and disjuncture."47 For example, postmodernism has readily
embraced anti-essentialism, which honors a plurality of voices
rather than a single voice for women or people of color.48 In short,
postmodernism seeks to restore to the natural world those pieces
that were amputated in rationalism's rush to jam reality into neat,
razor-sharp, Cartesian boxes.
As Schlag points out, this taxonomy of cognitive frameworks
(pre-rationalism, rationalism, modernism and postmodernism) it-
self reeks of rationalist sensibilities. 49 Yet, his presentation of our
cognitive vocabulary emphasizes that slippage between frame-
works-utilizing different frameworks in rapid succession within
one narrative-is a frequent occurrence, and that one experiencing
such slippage will be unable to stand outside these events and ob-
jectively evaluate them because "the ego is already within its own
cognitive orientation of the moment."50 Further, the dissonance
that results from incongruity between the cognitions of the author
and the reader is both far less and far more prevalent than what
might be expected.51
The dissonance is far less prevalent because rationalism is
the "Pacman" of legal discourse, the hegemonic voice that empow-
ers the reader to employ objective reason in evaluating neutral
rules of law in order to rationally adjudicate the truth value of a
text.52 When presented with another mode of cognition, rational-
ism gobbles it up and attempts to digest and integrate it by prom-
ulgating a "solution" to a normative inquiry. 53 For example, ra-
tionalism swallows modernism and produces a version of
pragmatism that embraces the "received description and under-
standing of the world;" 54 skepticism which repudiates the deeper
de-centering of the self endemic to modernist inquiry;55 and mod-
46. See id.
47. Id. at 1241.
48. See infra notes 141-143 and accompanying text (discussing anti-
essentialism).
49. See Schlag, Missing Pieces, supra note 8, at 1220.
50. Id. at 1221.
51. See id. at 1222.
52. See id. at 1227.
53. See id.
54. Id. at 1224.
55. See id. at 1225.
[Vol. 16:493
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eling which transmogrifies the modernist vision into discrete,
manageable sectors of jurisprudence (e.g., law as literature or law
as economics).56 This refraining of modernist cognitions into ra-
tionalist forms eliminates the threatening and crucial moment
where the self is dethroned as ultimate authority.
Rationalism similarly gulps down and neutralizes preration-
alism57 and postmodernism.58 In this way, rationalism has won
control of legal discourse, particularly within the context of judicial
opinions but also within the legal academy. 59
When a rationalist reader does confront a non-rationalist
text, she may not experience cognitive dissonance since, in her
view, the text is readily assimilable, translatable, fodder for the
individual self seated on her throne. But, in fact, authors and
readers readily slip in and out of cognitive frameworks depending
on the needs of the moment, resulting in far more dissonance than
one might expect.60 For example, Justice Scalia's frequent prera-
tionalist pleas for a return to "tradition"61 are liberally sprinkled
among rationalist invocations of the neutral rule of law. 62 Schlag's
article itself consciously slips between frameworks: first asserting
a prerationalist canon that dissonant cognitive frameworks exist;
next building a four-tiered rationalist model of the frameworks;
then impeaching the taxonomy and, in the modernist tradition, re-
vealing its inadequacies; 63 and finally, conducting a postmodernist
inquiry into incommensurable audience fragmentation and its im-
plications for delivering a message to an audience as a whole. 64
56. See id. at 1226.
57. For example, rationalists might characterize framers' intent "as just an-
other silly animism." Id. at 1227.
58. Schlag quips: "Simply imagine Diderot interrogating Derrida on the ques-
tion of where and how deconstruction should be treated in the encyclopedia.
Should it be entered under the subject heading of philosophy or literary criticism?
What are its main points? Themes? Underlying assumptions?' Id. at 1227.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 1228.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2291-93 (1996) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (arguing that tradition supports the value of single sex military
education provided by the government); Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629,
1633 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the preservation of "traditional
sexual mores" as attempted by a Colorado amendment is not prohibited by any
principle in the Constitution or judicial history).
62. See, e.g., Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2294 C'It is only necessary to apply honestly
the test the Court has been applying to sex-based classifications for the past two
decades."); Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629, 1631 (arguing that the holding of Bowers v.
Hardwick is "unassailable, except by those who think that the Constitution
changes to suit current fashions").
63. See Schlag, Missing Pieces, supra note 8, at 1232.
64. See id. at 1241.
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When readers do sense cognitive dissonance, reactions vary.
Prerationalists term it an "unconscionable departure[ ] . . . from
the sacred text;" rationalists encode it as "individualized intellec-
tual error."65 Modernists compensate for cognitive deficits in one
area by increasing the cognitive ballast in another area-
maintaining the integrity of the system. For example, "the realist
insists on freeing judges from the arbitrariness of doctrine. This
view creates a deficit in the written law, and realists typically
surmount this deficit with a prerationalist faith in the judge as the
jurisprudential near-equivalent of the noble savage." 66 Postmod-
ernists, on the other hand, repudiate such a stabilized, holistic ac-
count and embrace the dissonance.67
As cognitive dissonance proliferates, "[w]hat Lenin did to
Marx, Posner does to Coase, and somebody does to Duncan Ken-
nedy. And it happens ever faster . . . [P]ostmodernism tends to
crystallize into a modernist (mis)understanding; modernism usu-
ally precipitates in rationalist solutions; rationalism degenerates
into prerationalist prejudice."6 8 The possibility of truly communi-
cating with one's audience recedes. 69
2. The Subject/Object Dichotomy
Peller has strongly critiqued rationalism and modernism, ex-
tending the principle of linguistic relativity70 to the evolution of
conceptual frameworks. In his view:
[The interpretive constructs of an ideology abstract from the
thick texture of the world to provide a structure that deter-
mines which particular aspects of the world are seen as
meaningful, and finally which aspects are seen. When par-
ticular representational categories for dividing up the world
are reified and achieve a hegemony in a particular commu-
nity, description is taken as fact rather than "mere" opinion or
ideology. In such a context, the social conventions for repre-
senting the world are viewed as flowing from the way the
65. Id. at 1234.
66. Id. at 1235.
67. See id.
68. Id. at 1238.
69. Note that this concern about (mis)reading is inherently rationalist and in-
tentionalist in nature, presupposing that it is important that an individual author
communicate her views to the individual reader, and that a text has a fixed and
determinate meaning that can be communicated. See Thomas C. Grey, The Her-
meneutics File, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 211, 226 (1985); see also infra notes 90-91 and
accompanying text (contrasting the intentionalist approach with that of hermeneu-
tists who believe that interpretation is inherently indeterminate).
70. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing Whorfs principle of
linguistic relativity).
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world really is. Their contingent and provisional status is
suppressed. Fiction is presented as truth.7 1
In this way, legal reasoning, like any ideology, is intrinsically
political inasmuch as it silences other modes of discourse. 72 Ra-
tionality, such as it is, represents merely the sensation that one
proposition should follow another because "particular metaphors
for categorizing likeness and difference in the world have become
frozen, or institutionalized as common sense."
73
Peller uses the following sentence as an illustration: "the al-
ternative to disintegrating violence is the establishment of regu-
larized and peaceable methods of decision."74 This sentence is
predicated upon the peace/violence dichotomy and the or-
der/disorder dichotomy. In other words, "law, order, institutionali-
zation, and peace" are placed in opposition to "nonlaw, disorder,
noninstitutionalization, and violence." Although this paradigm
may initially seem palatable, it implicitly excludes the reality that
disorder can be peaceful (e.g., Vietnam War protests) and that or-
der can be violent (e.g., the Nazi regime). It therefore privileges
subordination and denigrates insubordination. 7
5
Peller's most penetrating insight is that the dichotomies em-
braced by the formalists (public/private, free will/coercion) and by
the realists (facts/values, is/ought) were both the progeny of a
metaphor embedded in human perception: the subject/object di-
chotomy.76 This metaphor is grounded on the metaphysical as-
sumption that reality can be divided between subjective experience
(inside the "I") and objective experience (outside the "I"). The for-
malists privileged the subjective; rationalism empowered the
"individual," and doctrines such as freedom of contract rested on
such privileging. Legal realism flipped the equation, privileging
the objective, demonstrating that it was the public world that con-
stituted the private. 77 The subject/object dichotomy has also given
rise to the politics (subjective)/law (objective) distinction, a distinc-
tion that is readily collapsed "once the inevitably contingent and
indeterminate character of the representation of social events [is]
revealed."78 Other offspring include the familiar oppositions of
71. Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1181
(1985).
72. See id. at 1153.
73. Id. at 1156.
74. Id. at 1184.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 1154.
77. See id. at 1248-49.
78. Id. at 1239.
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man/nature, mind/body, thought/experience, theory/practice,
form/substance and reason/will.7 9 In contemporary jurisprudence,
critical legal theorists privilege the subjective (all is indetermi-
nate), while law and economics scholars privilege the objective
(claiming its methods are "neutrar').O
All of these constructs are predicated on the myth that the
observed and the observer are segregable. Even the paradigmatic
image of the scientist as objective observer has been exploded by
quantum mechanics: the observer necessarily alters that which
she observes.8 1 The subject/object dichotomy is an illusion because
there is no private, inner realm where the self encounters herself
without the mediation of the social constructs and categories of the
objective world, internalized via the intake function of her lan-
guage. Similarly, there is no pure, objective, outer world that we
experience that exists outside of our presence, our actions and con-
ceptions.8 2
In general, the subject/object dichotomy "exteriorizes" all
"otherness" because humans cannot experience themselves "in Na-
ture"; rather, they experience Nature as external, objective and
independent. 83 The body (irrational, like nature, and externally
observable, at least in part) is exteriorized from the mind (rational,
unobservable). The reason/desire dichotomy follows easily.84 And
so we construct, flipping the paradigm occasionally,8 5 but missing
the point:
The myth of the subject/object metaphor is the projection of
some place ... that is outside social inscription. But there is
no point beyond social inscription, no law separate from poli-
tics, no knowledge separate from power, no reason separate
from imagination, no things underneath mere words, and no
free subjects separate from social language.8 6
79. See id. at 1264.
80. See id. at 1267.
81. See HILARY PUTNAM, 1 MATHEMATICS, MATTER AND METHOD: PHILO-
SOPHICAL PAPERS 134 (1975) (quoting Von Neuman's axiomatization of quantum
mechanics: "a measurement throws a system discontinuously into a new state");
see also STEPHEN HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME: FROM THE BIG BANG TO
BLACK HOLES 54 (1988). For an accessible account of the application of quantum
mechanics to jurisprudence, see Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitu-
tional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1,
5, 17-19 (1989).
82. See Peller, supra note 71, at 1268-69.
83. See id. at 1276.
84. See id. at 1276-77.
85. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
86. Peller, supra note 71, at 1290.
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Applying Peller's insights to Schlag's taxonomy, it seems
clear that rationalism and modernism engage in the subject/object
dichotomy-rationalism privileging the subjective, and modernism
privileging the objective.87 Prerationalism privileges the subjec-
tive to the point where it extinguishes the objective: the sacred
text is assigned ultimate authority by the subjective reader, and
acceptance of the canon as a "given" is assumed. Postmodernism,
at first blush, may have seemed to evade the subject/object distinc-
tion. But in its quest to honor the plurality of voices and to high-
light conflict, has it simply made way for the existence of multiple,
coexisting, and conflicting subject/object distinctions? All the
voices are in the room now; there is a cacophony. But are they
really saying anything different? Or does postmodernism merely
focus on the phenomenon that no one is being silenced and that
the resulting din, while uncomfortable, is a more authentic repre-
sentation of reality than that which we have constructed to date?
D. Meaning: "Light[ing] Up the Thick Darkness of the
Language"88
We have looked at the contingency of the self, of language as
it constructs and communicates our perception of what is real, of
our conceptual frameworks themselves. Now, brimming over with
all of this indeterminacy, we confront a text, which cheerfully
awaits our interpretation. What now?
Some hermeneutists89 essentially assert that as the reader
bends to pore over a text, her brimming indeterminacies pour all
over the page. The intake function of language mediates, slices
and encodes. Categories are accessed; boxes fill. Contrary to in-
tentionalists, who assert that "the only plausible object of interpre-
tation is the author's intended meaning,"90 these hermeneutists
assert that the author's intent is only one, but not necessarily the
best, interpretation of many possible readings of a text.91 These
differing perspectives engender another debate about how mean-
ing is extracted from language.
87. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
88. WHORF, Introduction, in LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND REALITY, supra note 20,
at 1, 26.
89. A "hermeneutist" is "one versed in hermeneutics" which is "the science of
interpretation .... WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 851 (1966).
90. Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Intention, Identity, and the Consti-
tution: A Response to David Hoy, in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND
PRACTICE 187, 187 (Gregory Leyh ed., 1992) [hereinafter LEGAL HERMENEUTICS].
91. See David Couzens Hoy, Intentions and the Law: Defending Hermeneutics,
in LEGAL HERMENEUTIcS, supra note 90, at 173, 180.
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Intentionalists separate the moment of extraction into two
events: (1) figuring out what the language means; and (2) apply-
ing it to the present facts.9 2 This sounds familiar: it is another
version of the subject/object distinction-the theory/practice di-
chotomy.9 3 Hermeneutics, according to David Cousins Hoy, col-
lapses the dichotomy by declaring that "understanding is not a
separate moment from interpretive application ... understanding
is always already interpretation" because it is "always conditioned
by the context in which it occurs," and because those contextual
features that the reader highlights as the foreground and those
she relegates to the background are part of the extraction of
meaning from a text.94 Perry extends this deconstruction by not-
ing that not only is "meaning always already... application (Hoy's
point) but also that application is always (further) specification of
meaning."95
Lest one take away from this the idea that all meaning is in-
determinate, save a term like "Big Mac," 96 whose meaning is, given
the proper context, quite determinate, Stanley Fish takes on the
indeterminacy/determinacy dichotomy:
It may be that at a general level interpretation and language
are radically indeterminate because every interpretation
(decision, specification of meaning) rests on a ground that is
itself interpretive and therefore challengeable; but since life is
lived not at the general level but in local contexts that are
stabilized (if only temporarily) by assumptions already and
invisibly in place, the inherent indeterminacy of interpreta-
tion is without the practical consequences both feared and
hoped for it. 97
In other words, one can always deconstruct a judicial deci-
sion, but people "act on it, [are] influence[d] in their calculations
by it, cite it, invoke it, believe in it."98 This is true in large part be-
cause we demand that a "rule of law" emerge from our judicial
opinions; we require a privileged reading in this context.99 Fish's
claim seems to be that, whether or not there is dissonance created
92. See id. at 173-74.
93. See id. at 174.
94. Id.
95. Michael J. Perry, Why Constitutional Theory Matters to Constitutional
Practice (and Vice Versa), in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS, supra note 90, at 241, 248
96. See Pierre Schlag, Authorizing Interpretation, 30 CONN. L. REv. 1065, 1070
(Spring 1998).
97. Stanley Fish, Play of Surfaces: Theory and the Law, in LEGAL HERME-
NEUTICS, supra note 90, at 297, 307.
98. Id. at 308.
99. See Thomas Morawetz, Law and Literature, in A COMPANION TO PHI-
LOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 450, 457 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
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by our various readings of the "rule of law," our behavior with re-
gard to it constructs its determinacy. Judicial opinions are there-
fore always indeterminate and determinate at the same time.
When viewed from afar, all texts are indeterminate; but from the
short range, the local context, where interpretation is "experienced
and practiced," texts are necessarily determinate. 100
So although Fish deconstructs the indeterminacy/
determinacy dichotomy, he seems almost simultaneously to bifur-
cate the two once again and to privilege determinacy by asserting
that "theory doesn't matter" and that "a situation-specific determi-
nacy provides all the stability one needs." 10 1 Is he not restating
the interpretation/application dichotomy? Is this not another ren-
dition of the subject/object distinction? The subjective, indetermi-
nate, interpretive reading is opposed to the objective, determinate,
moment of application. The subjective indeterminacy of theory is
denigrated; objective, situation-specific determinacy occurs where
law is really lived out. It appears that Fish fell prey to the realist's
fate: instead of collapsing the subject/object distinction, he merely
flipped it and privileged the objective sector.
Others join Fish in his assertion that the indeterminacy
quandary is overrated. Owen Fiss accepts that multiple readings
are possible, but he believes the freedom of the reader to create
meaning is "constrained by rules that derive their authority from
an interpretive community that is itself held together by the com-
mitment to the rule of law."' 0 2 Hoy asserts that a reader cannot
interpret a text arbitrarily, because "[c]ontext will still constrain
the possible alternatives, and variations or shifts between possible
contexts will be constrained by factors such as suitability, purpose,
and plausibility." 03 The moment of interpretation and application
may be one and the same, but constraints still exist. As Fish ex-
plains: "[i]nterpreters are constrained by their tacit awareness of
what is possible and not possible to do, what is and is not a rea-
100. See Fish, supra note 97, at 308. In other words, when a judge reaches a
concrete result based on her reading of a judicial opinion, she provides the text
with a determinate meaning in that context, and yet at the same time, absent the
necessity of reaching such a result, the text is inherently indeterminate.
101. Id. Robert Weisberg has noted Fish's tendency to "typically retreat[ ] into
complacent assumptions that indeterminacy does not exist at the institutional
level at which it would be most dangerous." Robert Weisberg, The Law-Literature
Enterprise, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 44 n. 150 (1988).
102. Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 740, 762
(1982).
103. David Couzens Hoy, Interpreting the Law: Hermeneutical and Poststruc-
turalist Perspectives, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC
READER 319, 330 (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988).
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sonable thing to say, and what will and will not be heard as evi-
dence in a given enterprise ... "104
Still, the modes of prerationalist and rationalist judicial in-
terpretation, these "rules" which are relied upon so heavily to con-
strain misreadings of, for example, a statutory text, are easily im-
peached. By the 1990s, this recital could bore us to tears. The
textualist approach is eminently assailable because plain meaning,
insofar as it exists, is a function of interpretive assumptions rather
than anything inherent in the words on the page. 105 The inten-
tionalist project is derailed as soon as one asks for the identity of
the author(s) of legislation-Congress? Those who voted? Staff
persons who actually drafted the bill? Were all their intentions
the same? Did the individuals involved each have the same intent
from moment to moment?10 6 These questions pervade even with-
out addressing the hermeneutical problems revolving around the
reader. If the reader tries to determine intent by examining the
context of the statute, she will:
[R]un up against the problem that any given context is open to
further description. Context does not exist somewhere. Con-
text is constructed by the interpreter according to her calculus
of relevance and irrelevance. A particular description of the
context involves screening the text through representational
terms used by the interpreter. It is an effect of the inter-
preter's differentiation of what outside the work counts and
what doesn't. Accordingly, context is the result of the inter-
preter's activity rather than the ground for it. 107
The notion of precedent as meaningful constraint is equally
assailable; fields of precedent are eminently manipulable by a
judge who has (consciously or unconsciously) determined "how I
want to come out."108 So the realists urged judges to decide cases
based on the current sociolegal context, invoking the tired debate
104. Stanley Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in the Law and in
Literary Criticism, in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION 271, 281 (W.J.T. Mitchell
ed., 1983); see supra note 96.
105. See Paul Campos, That Obscure Object of Desire: Hermeneutics and the
Autonomous Legal Text, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1065, 1071 (1993); see also supra notes
20-24 and accompanying text.
106. See id.
107. Peller, supra note 71, at 1172-73.
108. Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical
Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518, 519 (1986). The scope of manipulable
precedent is the locus of much debate. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 119-20, 150 (1961) (describing law's "core of certainty and... penumbra of
doubt," and relegating the "rule-sceptic" to the "fringe"); Kennedy, supra, at 549-50
(describing most cases as manipulable but acknowledging the normative pull of
precedent); Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 408-14 (1985)
(locating most cases in the penumbra with only a few residing in the core).
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about separation of powers and result-oriented, activist judging.
To escape these jurisprudential ruts, we must look to:
[IT]he hope of transforming theories of [ ] interpretation from a
strained recital of increasingly unbelievable fictions (the plain
meaning rule, the intent of the legislature, the superior wis-
dom of the judge) into an open-ended, pragmatic inquiry that
employs a melange of methodologies in a tentative search for
a shifting and contingent truth. 109
As a discipline, hermeneutics itself bears traces of rationalist
foundations: the very question "how should we interpret texts" be-
trays a normative orientation which neutralizes postmodernist
ambitions. 110 While hermeneutics may empower each reader to
interpret on her own terms, seated on her throne, employing ego-
centered reason, the challenge of transcending the subject-object
distinction remains like an unscaled peak in the distance. Does it
not beckon?
III. Social Relations: In the Academy and in the Courtroom
How do we move from prerationalist to postmodernist concep-
tions and beyond in the realm of judicial opinions and legal schol-
arship? How do we collapse the subject/object dichotomy and ap-
ply such ideas in the courtroom and classroom? That there is a
critical need to do so is the subject of this section, which examines
two areas of jurisprudence in contemporary legal scholarship:
critical white studies and intersectionality theory; and two cases
that were pending before the United States Supreme Court in the
1997 Term: Taxman v. Board of Education of Piscataway"' (now
settled) and Miller v. Christopher.112 All are illustrative of the ar-
bitrary, political and contingent nature of the "rule of law," and all
demonstrate how definitions of identity, the language grid, cogni-
tive frameworks and assignment of meaning have constructed a
legal world of rights and entitlements that sometimes intersects
poorly with reality.
A. Critical White Studies: Discerning Transparency
Critical white studies is a body of literature emerging from
critical race studies, which, in turn, was engendered by the leftist
109. Campos, supra note 105, at 1073.
110. See Schlag, Missing Pieces, supra note 8, at 1246.
111. 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506 (1997), cert. dis-
missed, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997) (dismissal due to settlement of the case).
112. 96 F.3d 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1551 (1997), cert.
limited, 117 S. Ct. 1689 (1997).
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critical legal studies movement. 113 Critical white studies seeks an
"antiracist white identity"1 4 and examines how law, culture and
language construct white privilege. 1 5 Barbara Flagg, one of the
movement's most prolific scholars," 6 argues that a crucial feature
of white identity is transparency: "the tendency of whites not to
think about whiteness, or about norms, behaviors, experiences, or
perspectives that are white-specific." 1 7 Because such norms and
behaviors are experienced as neutral, assimilation is required of
people of color even as diversity and plurality are invoked as de-
sirable values. 118
It is in this way that institutional, structural racism is main-
tained, ensuring that whites are systematically advantaged, and
that cultural racism, "the usually unstated assumption that white
culture is superior to all others," is practiced." 9 Pat Cain has re-
counted transparency at work: when asked to use three adjectives
to describe themselves, white women never include the adjective
"white," whereas women of color invariably include their "race" as
one of the three adjectives. 120 Another anecdotal but readily credi-
ble example: when Flagg's life partner mentioned to a white
friend that Flagg was teaching a course in critical race theory, the
response was one of surprise--"but isn't she whiteT'-as if white is
not a racial category.121
Institutional and cultural discrimination take place when
transparently white norms are imposed upon non-whites as neu-
tral codes of conduct. 122 Take, as a hypothetical, a person of color
who chooses to change her name, to dress and to speak in a way
113. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Introduction to CRITICAL WHITE
STUDIES, supra note 9, at xviii.
114. Barbara J. Flagg, Changing the Rules: Some Preliminary Thoughts on Doc-
trinal Reform, Indeterminacy, and Whiteness, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 250, 250
(1996) [hereinafter Flagg, Changing the Rules].
115. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 113, at xviii.
116. For some of Flagg's scholarly works, see Flagg, Changing the Rules, supra
note 114; Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently
White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009 (1995) [hereinafter Flagg,
Fashioning a Title VII Remedy]; Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See," supra note 9.
117. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See," supra note 9, at 957.
118. See id.
119. Id. at 959.
120. See Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 208 (1989-1990).
121. See Flagg, 'Was Blind, But Now I See,"supra note 9, at 970.
122. See Kimberlb Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Trans-
formation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331,
1379 (1988) ("The white norm continues in an unspoken form as a statement of the
positive social norm, legitimating the continuing domination of those who do not
meet it.").
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that reflects her heritage. If, because of these qualities, she is not
viewed by white management as "promotion material," she has
been subjected to an arbitrary, contingent world view that, none-
theless, may be experienced by white management as neutral,
well-reasoned and "colorblind."'
123
Professor powell describes the phenomenon of transparency
as a "smooth fit between societal norms of Whiteness and the con-
structed identity of Whites [that] creates an illusion of coherence
and racial invisibility or neutrality--of 'normality."' 124  Critical
scholars have long sought to make the invisible visible: success
has been described as noticing the fishbowl after one has looked at
goldfish all of one's life. 125
All of this tracks nicely with the rationalist paradigm, which
exalts the "my way or the highway" presentation of transparent
white norms rather than the postmodernist validation of multiple
voices and ways of being. To the extent white norms are noticed at
all, they are justified as the result of a neutral, reasoned approach
to the world. When white norms are experienced as transparent,
we resemble Whorfs breed of people who could only see in shades
of blue and thus lacked color terms in their language.
12 6
Flagg concedes that critical legal studies embraces the inde-
terminacy thesis more than critical race or critical white studies
does; the latter two tend to prescribe doctrinal reform and so
evince some faith that a rationalist structure could work. 127 As be-
fits a rationalist (with postmodernist aims-the dissonance is pal-
pable), Flagg engages in a series of normative suggestions as to
how to focus on the fishbowl. She suggests that a white person
should:
[1] make explicit the whiteness of transparently white norms
by labeling herself and her community's existing standards as
123. See Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy, supra note 116, at 2010-12.
powell has pointed out that on a macro level:
What is ignored in [the] cultural analysis of the inner city .. .is the ex-
plicit role that the White majority and the government itself have played
in creating and maintaining this racialized space, in creating a society
where good neighborhoods are defined as White neighborhoods and in de-
fining positive individual characteristics as White characteristics. White
flight ... has been fueled by racist fears and facilitated by a host of gov-
ernment policies ....
john a. powell, The "Racing" of American Society: Race Functioning as a Verb Be-
fore Signifying as a Noun, 15 LAW & INEQ. J. 99, 111 (1997).
124. powell, supra note 5, at 1493.
125. See id. at 1482 n.5 (citing TONI MORRISON, PLAYING IN THE DARK:
WHITENESS AND THE LITERARY IMAGINATION 13-16 (1992)).
126. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.




[2] examine the goals her decisionmaking processes are de-
signed to serve, to see whether they too are effectively white-
specific and, if so, whether they can be reconceptualized in a
more racially inclusive manner[;]
[3] deliberately select rules of decision that do not advantage
whites... [and] adopt culturally diverse strategies for accom-
plishing her purposes[;] 128
and
[4] consciously employ privilege to the advantage of those
who are not in a position of privilege-in this instance,
nonwhites. For example, [a] white[ ] in a position to do so
might appoint as judges only people of color. Analogously, [a]
white[ ] who ha[s] input into the process of doctrinal formation
can advocate legal rules that might effect greater racial jus-
tice. 129
Let us take these as noble, moral suggestions. Still, questions
remain. Can we reach a postmodernist world that honors multiple
perspectives by employing a normative, rationalist program? Can
we get there from here, especially that way? Is this a case of ra-
tionalism munching up postmodernism, or is it the only moral way
to address the issue, to seek solutions? Is it immoral to abdicate
the search for solutions in the face of inequity? Is the question
about morality intrinsically rationalist inasmuch as it presupposes
an individual selfadjudicating the answer to the question?
B. Intersectionality Theory: The Whole Is More Than the
Sum of the Parts
Scientists, as well as critical race scholars, have launched an
eviscerating attack on the Cartesian constructs of racial catego-
ries. 130 A belief in "race," based on observation of phenotypic dif-
128. Flagg, 'Was Blind, But Now I See," supra note 9, at 991-92.
129. Flagg, Changing the Rules, supra note 114, at 257.
130. Scientists now generally concur that "[tihe term 'race' is a social construct."
C. Loring Brace, Region Does Not Mean "Race"-Reality Versus Convention in Fo-
rensic Anthropology, 40 J. FORENSIC SCI. 171, 174 (1995). The use of the term
"Asian" or '2Mongoloid" to characterize the morphometrically differing peoples of
China, Korea, Japan and regions to the south is extremely misleading. "White" or
"Caucasian" cannot accurately collapse the disparate genetic backgrounds of peo-
ples from Scandinavia to Iran and through South Asia. "Black" or "Negroid" are
likewise inherently inadequate descriptions of populations from the "tropics of the
Old World, from Africa through India to Australia," whose only common bond is
the production of melanin. Id. at 171. Whites and blacks have greater genetic
variation within their respective "races" than between them. For example, the
Spaniard and North African are more genetically similar than the Spaniard and
the Swede. See Ian F. Haney Lbpez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Obser-
vations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 12
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ferences, has been equated by one scientist to a belief in Greek and
Roman deities based on observation of the planets carrying their
names. 31 "[T]here is no question that we see phenotypic diversity,
but ... it is invalid to conclude that this diversity constitutes a re-
ality called 'race."' 132
Still, the terms "black" and "white" remain culturally power-
ful concepts, despite the cajoling of science. One commentator has
posited that, from the earliest days of slavery, "black" was con-
structed in opposition to "white."133 Indeed, whites projected upon
black slaves "the terror of European outcasts, their dread of fail-
ure, powerlessness, Nature without limits, natal loneliness, inter-
nal aggression."'' 3 4 Blackness and whiteness retain cultural resil-
ience because they are maintained in opposition to "the other";
neither construct can survive alone. 135
The boxes fill, but as usual, much of reality is lopped off in
the process. For example, racial categories render invisible the
fact that seventy-five to ninety percent of the "black" population is
multiracial but is classified as black. 136 "Virtually all latinos and
Filipinos" and "the majority of' native americans and Hawaiians
are multiracial, and a "significant" proportion of white-identified
individuals are multiracial as well.' 37 The number of multiracial
Americans is increasing: in 1970, the number of children living in
(1994). Further, populations that look alike may be genetically quite different
(Philippine or Malay Negritos and African Pygmies or Bushmen), and those that
appear different may be genetically quite similar (Europeans and Northern Indi-
ans). See Masatoshi Nei & Arun K. Roychoudhury, Genetic Relationship and Evo-
lution of Human Races, in 14 EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 1, 43 (Max K Hecht et al.
eds., 1982) (examining the genic variation within and between several races). As
Livingstone said three decades ago: 'There are no races, there are only clines."
Frank B. Livingstone, On the Non-Existence of Human Races, 3 CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY 279 (1962).
131. See Kenneth A. R. Kennedy, But Professor, Why Teach Race Identification
if Races Don't Exist?, 40 J. FORENSIC SCI. 797, 799 (1995).
132. Id.
133. See Toni Morrison, Playing in the Dark.- Whiteness and the Literary Imagi-
nation, in CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES, supra note 9, at 79, 81.
134. Id.
135. See powell, supra note 5, at 1512-13 (explaining that one is defined by ex-
cluding the other).
136. See Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not Just Black and
White Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REV. 957, 964 (1995). Indeed, as Trina Grillo has
pointed out, many famous "black" leaders have, in fact, been multiracial: for ex-
ample, Booker T. Washington, Frederick Douglass and W.E.B. DuBois. See GriUo,
supra note 5, at 25 n.36.
137. Ramirez, supra note 136, at 968. While I have capitalized terms like
"Hawaiian" or "Filipino" because they describe people from discrete geographic re-
gions, I have not capitalized terms like "white," "black," or "latino" because such
terms conflate the identity of groups from many geographic areas.
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families with one white parent and one black, asian or native
american parent was less than 400,000.138 That number had tri-
pled by 1990 to 1.5 million children, without counting children of
single or divorced parents. 139 Still, the resilience of racial categori-
zation is tenacious: in October 1997, the U.S. Government decided
not to include a "multiracial" category in the next census, sug-
gesting instead that multiracial Americans list themselves in "as
many racial categories as apply."'140
Intersectionality theory takes the resistance to essentialist
categorization one step further by asserting that individuals con-
tain many intersecting traits, and that simply adding together the
traits does not adequately describe the experience of such intersec-
tions. 41 For example, the discrimination experienced by women of
color cannot be quantified by adding together the experience of ra-
cial discrimination and of gender discrimination. 142 Indeed, femi-
nists of color have long complained that feminism has all too fre-
quently relegated the experience of black women to the
background:
I call this the "nuance theory" approach to the problem of es-
sentialism: by being sensitive to the notion that different
women have different experiences, generalizations can be of-
fered about "all women" while qualifying statements, often in
footnotes, supplement the general account with the subtle nu-
ances of experience that "different" women add to the mix....
The problem with nuance theory is that by defining black
women as "different," white women quietly become the norm.
143
Transparency is at work again. To escape from the tyranny
of categories and to validate that all identity exists along a contin-
uum 44 is a truly postmodernist vision. And lest the continuum
appear too linear, we must remember that the message of the in-
tersectionality and the anti-essentialism critique is to "define com-
138. See Ramirez, supra note 136, at 967.
139. See id.
140. See Government Rejects Multiracial Category for Census (visited Oct. 29,
1997) <http://www.cnn.com/US/971...s.race.ap/index.html>. For an interesting
discussion of the movement for a multiracial category, see Grillo, supra note 5, at
25.
141. See powell, supra note 5, at 1511.
142. See Kimberlb Williams Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,
Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241,
1244 (1991) (noting that "the intersection of racism and sexism factors into Black
women's lives in ways that cannot be captured wholly by looking at the race or
gender dimensions of those experiences separately"); GriUo, supra note 5, at 18.
143. Harris, supra note 4, at 595.
144. See Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Unbearable Lightness of Identity, 11
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 207, 210 (1996).
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plex experiences as closely to their full complexity as possible and
that we not ignore voices at the margin."145
Intersectionality appears to be supporting a move from ra-
tionalism to postmodernism in the arena of race and gender iden-
tity. Yet the same tension exists with regard to the efficacy of us-
ing normative recommendations, such as the command to honor
complexity, to reach a postmodernist goal. The suspicion remains
that, even if achieved, postmodernism may simply constitute a
move to a multiplicity of subject/object distinctions. Is this
enough? Does it get us where we want to go?
C. Constructing Cartesian Dichotomies: Taxman v. Board
of Education of Piscataway 146
I offer a truncated discussion of two cases that were pending
before the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1997 term, not for the pur-
poses of conducting a full, casenote-like analysis, but to illustrate
the contingent, political nature of the rule of law, and of transpar-
ency at work. Taxman settled before the Supreme Court could de-
cide the case; 147 however, the Third Circuit opinion merits further
examination as an example of how malleable legal analysis can be.
As the Third Circuit's Taxinan dissent noted, "[i]n the law... it is
often how the question is framed that determines the answer that
is received."'148 From the rationalist perspective, the question is
framed, and the neutral rule of law is then applied by an objective
court, guided by ego-centered reason. This is the discourse of most
judicial opinions;149 even its critics wonder if it could be other-
wise.15 0
The Board of Education of Piscataway, New Jersey developed
an affirmative action policy in 1975 which specified that 'when
145. Grillo, supra note 5, at 22.
146. 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506 (1997), and cert.
dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997) (dismissal due to settlement of the case).
147. See Julian E. Barnes, Rights Groups Choose to Settle, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Dec. 1, 1997, at 41 (reporting that "the board of education retreated when
civil rights groups agreed to pay 70 percent of the $433,500 settlement offered
Sharon Taxman, a white teacher laid off in 1989 so a black teacher could keep her
job").
148. Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1567 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
149. See Schlag, Missing Pieces, supra note 8, at 1248 (stating that "the cogni-
tive orientations that dominate judge-made law are largely prerationalism and
rationalism").
150. See Pierre Schlag, Address at the 1997 Day, Berry & Howard Visiting
Scholar Speech, University of Connecticut School of Law (Oct. 24, 1997)
(responding to question from audience by stating that he was not sure it was ap-
propriate for judges to be more candid regarding the moral normative commitment
underlying the moment of decision).
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candidates appear to be of equal qualification, candidates meeting
the criteria of the affirmative action program will be recom-
mended."' 151 The purpose of the policy, as indicated in a document
added to the policy in 1983, is to "ensure [ ] equal employment op-
portunity . . .and prohibit [ ] discrimination in employment be-
cause of ... race,"' not to remedy results of prior discrimination or
underrepresentation of people of color within the school system. 152
In 1989, the Board needed to lay off one teacher in the Business
Department of Piscataway High School. 153 Sharon Taxman (white)
and Debra Williams (black), two teachers in the department, had
equal seniority because both began work on the same day in
1980.154
In the past, the Board had broken similar ties by drawing lots
or using other random procedures, but they had never been faced
with a tie between persons of different races. 155 Accordingly, the
superintendent recommended that the affirmative action plan be
invoked because the two teachers "'were tied in seniority, were
equally qualified, and because Ms. Williams was the only Black
teacher in the Business Education Department."' 156 The Board
followed the superintendent's recommendation, terminating Ms.
Taxman in the interest of cultural diversity.157
Taxman filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission, and the United States filed a Title VII suit in the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
(Taxman intervened). 158 The district court granted partial sum-
mary judgment for the United States and Taxman, but trial pro-
ceeded regarding damages. 159 In the meantime, Taxman was re-
hired by the Board; she was eventually awarded damages in the
amount of $134,014.62 for "backpay, fringe benefits, and prejudg-
ment interest."'160 A jury awarded her an additional $10,000 for
emotional suffering under the New Jersey antidiscrimination stat-
ute.161 The Board appealed to the Third Circuit (regarding the
151. Taxrnan, 91 F.3d at 1550 (quoting the Board's affirmative action policy).
152. Id. (quoting the Board's 1983 affirmative action policy)
153. See id. at 1551.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id. (quoting the superintendent's recommendation).
157. See id. at 1552 (noting that the President of the Board cited cultural diver-
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granting of summary judgment as to liability), and Taxman cross-
appealed (regarding the dismissal of her claim for punitive dam-
ages).' 62
1. The Third Circuit's Majority Opinion
The majority opinion, penned by Judge Mansmann, framed
the question as "whether Title VII permits an employer with a ra-
cially balanced work force to grant a non-remedial racial prefer-
ence in order to promote 'racial diversity."' 163 The majority an-
swered the question in the negative. 164 The court supported its
decision by constructing a remedial/non-remedial dichotomy, citing
United Steelworkers v. Weber 65 for the proposition that Congress,
in enacting Title VII, did not intend to "forbid all voluntary race-
conscious preferences," and that an affirmative action plan whose
purpose "mirror[ed] those of the statute" and that "did not
'unnecessarily trammel the interests of the [white] employees"
was permissible. 166 The majority then examined Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, 167 a gender affirmative action case, stating
that "a plan designed to eliminate work force imbalances in tradi-
tionally segregated job categories" satisfied Weber's first prong of
mirroring the purpose of Title VII.16 8 Prong two, refraining from
unnecessary trammeling of the rights of male employees, was met
in Johnson because the protected category was considered a 'plus'
factor, only one of several criteria" used in making the employment
decision. 169
Turning to the facts before it, the Third Circuit equated
"mirroring the purpose of Title VII" with constructing a reme-
dial/nonremedial dichotomy. To accomplish this, one must move
from identifying the purpose of Title VII as ending discrimination,
to the narrower purpose of merely remedying segrega-
tion/underrepresentation, to the final move of disenfranchising
plans to end discrimination based on a quest for diversity (which
address institutional and cultural discrimination) rather than on
remedying past injustices. These moves, although presented by
162. See id.
163. Id. at 1549-50.
164. See id. at 1550.
165. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
166. Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1554-55 (citations omitted).
167. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
168. Taxnman, 91 F.3d at 1556.
169. See id. (citing Johnson, 480 U.S. at 638-40).
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the majority as consecutive, reasoned and compelled conclusions,
are far from compulsory.
The court bolstered the narrowing of the "purpose of Title
VII" to remedial rather than pro-diversity motives by citing to leg-
islative intent. Aside from the serious hermeneutical difficulties
we encounter when we construct meaning from comments made
during congressional debate, 170 the quotations themselves are
hardly an indispensable predicate to the court's conclusion. For
example, Senator Humphrey is quoted as speaking of the country's
need to "assist those who have 'been excluded from the American
dream for so long."'171 Because there was only one black teacher in
the Business Department, 72 it is hard to see how retaining her
flew in the face of such intent. Further, no language was quoted
from the Congressional Record to indicate that, even if remedial
intent was the primary focus of the legislation, permissible plans
must be cabined to those plans that have only a remedial focus.
This is an inference that the judiciary has made on its own. It is
comparable to the legislature saying "peaches are good fruit," and
the judiciary interpreting that language to mean, "we must eat
only peaches."
2. The Dissent
The "straightforward statutory interpretation' ' 73 employed by
the majority met with a rigorous and cogent dissent, authored by
Chief Judge Sloviter. She opened by noting the importance of
framing the question correctly, asserting that a "broad legal refer-
endum on affirmative action policies" was not mandated by the
presentation of the case. 174 Rather, she would have formulated the
question as follows:
[W]hether Title VII requires a New Jersey school or school
board, which is faced with deciding which of two equally quali-
fied teachers should be laid off, to make its decision through a
coin toss or lottery, a solution that could be expected of the
state's gaming tables, or whether Title VII permits the school
board to factor into the decision its bona fide belief, based on
its experience with secondary schools, that students derive
170. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing hermeneutics and
legislative intent).
171. Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1557 (citation omitted).
172. See id. at 1551. In fact, there were no other teachers of color at all in the
Business Department. See id.
173. Id. at 1557.
174. Id. at 1567 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
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education benefit by having a Black faculty member in an oth-
erwise all-White department. 175
The dissent next attacked the majority's peaches inference,
urging that "it does not follow as a matter of logic" that because
the remedial plans in Weber176 and Johnson177 were upheld as
permissible, "every affirmative action plan that pursues some pur-
pose other than correcting a manifest imbalance or remedying past
discrimination will run afoul of Title VII."17 Sloviter then quoted
Weber as explicitly declining to delimit the outer bounds of af-
firmative action policies: to wit, "[w]e need not today define in de-
tail the line of demarcation between permissible and impermissi-
ble affirmative action plans."179 Further, the dissent urged, the
Johnson majority opinion engaged in no line-drawing; Stevens'
concurrence in Johnson explicitly repudiated any such activity ("I
write ... to. . .emphasize that the opinion does not establish the
permissible outer limits of voluntary [affirmative action] pro-
grams"); 80 and while O'Connor's concurrence argued for such lim-
its, "her vote was the sixth in favor of the majority's holding and
therefore not crucial to the outcome of the case. It follows that her
narrow reading should not be read as constituting the view of the
Court."'18
3. Reflections on Taxman
What is the peaches inference 8 2 all about? It should look, or
at least feel, familiar. The majority, in constructing the reme-
dial/nonremedial distinction, engaged in yet another subject/object
dichotomy, presented as an objective, neutral, compelled decision
based on the rule of law. How so? Where is the fishbowl in this
case? A better way to get a handle on the operation of trans-
parence in Taxnan (and in most contexts) is to ask oneself what is
most visible.
The most easily identified, most visible form of discrimination
(other than blatant, racist acts) is segregation. 83 If there are no
people of color in the room, there is a problem. This is a determi-
nation based on what is outside the "I," on the objective world.
175. Id.
176. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
177. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
178. Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1570.
179. Id. (quoting Weber, 443 U.S. at 208).
180. Id. (quoting Johnson, 480 U.S. at 642).
181. Id.
182. See supra page 128.
183. Segregation is, of course, also a blatant, racist act, writ large.
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Remedial affirmative action plans thus attack objective problems
of discrimination, those that are easily identified.
Once segregation is dealt with, what kinds of discrimination
are left? This is where institutional and cultural racism come into
play, transparencies, forms of discrimination that are inside the
"I,"- the subjective sector.184 "Nonremedial" affirmative action
plans target these issues by asserting that diversity, multicul-
turalism, and the like are valuable experiences for humans. Such
plans are, in fact, remedial-but they remedy subjective forms of
discrimination. For example, increased contact can make the in-
visible visible, can counteract the unconscious assumption that,
with regard to norms, "white is right."
But the majority cabined its understanding of the term
"remedial" to the objective realm. It constructed remedial, visible
(segregation-based), nontransparent, permissible plans in opposi-
tion to diversity-driven, invisible, transparent, impermissible
plans. Put another way, it bifurcated the remedial (objective) from
the diversity-driven (subjective) and privileged the objective sec-
tor. 8 5 As we have seen, this is an exceedingly easy move to make,
whether one engages in prerationalist appeals to a sacred text
(carefully constructed legislative intent, in this case), 86 or in ra-
tionalist apologetics for a neutral rule of law (carefully constructed
readings of Weber and Johnson).'87 The regnant jurisprudence of
transparency rolls on, seemingly "compelled" to churn out new
versions of the subject/object dichotomy wherever it goes. What
would the Supreme Court have done? It seems impossible that
they would done anything substantively different.
Note that, in another possible world, 188 affirmative action
might be conceptualized differently. Whites tend to unconsciously
operate under the assumption that jobs, a priori, belong to whites,
and that affirmative action seeks to bring people of color "up to
speed" by offering them some of those jobs. 8 9 In other words, as
184. See supra text accompanying notes 117-119 (discussing "transparency" as a
crucial aspect of white identity and racism).
185. See supra note 165-166 and accompanying text (recounting the Taxman
court's discussion of permissible affirmative action plans).
186. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing hermeneutics and
legislative intent).
187. See supra notes 165-168 and accompanying text (recounting the Taxman
court's reading of Weber and Johnson).
188. See ALAN ROSS ANDERSON ET AL., 2 ENTAILMENT: THE LOGIC OF RELEVANCE
AND NECESSITY 142-43 (1992); Saul A. Kripke, A Completeness Theorem in Modal
Logic, 24 J. SYMBOLIC LOGIC 1, 1-14 (1959).
189. See Eric Foner, Hiring Quotas for White Males Only, in CRITICAL WHITE
STUDIES, supra note 9, at 24, 25. Foner explains that "[n]onwhites (and women)
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uncomfortable as it may be to explicitly reveal the cognitive base-
line, affirmative action operates to "give" some of the white jobs to
people of color.
Imagine, instead, a world where jobs were divided according
to population. A certain percentage of jobs at every level were held
for whites, a certain percentage were held for blacks, a certain per-
centage held for latinos, for asians, native americans and so on.
Yes, we are talking quotas, but try not to throw the manuscript
down in horror. We are only talking possible worlds here; we are
making believe. Now, just experience the idea that whites held all
the jobs in this possible world because they took the ones that be-
longed to the other races. Now that affirmative action plans re-
quire them to relinquish some of these jobs, they are not giving
"white" jobs away. Instead, blacks, latinos, asians, native ameri-
cans and others are reclaiming jobs that were already theirs, that
belonged to them before the whites took possession. Do we not
think about affirmative action differently in this context? If we do,
explore the reasons why.
I am not, by the way, suggesting that this is an appropriate
or inappropriate vision of affirmative action. Among other things,
rigid divisions according to race tend to revitalize the construction
of race, something that most agree is a problematic way to solve
racial discrimination. 190 And whether or not quotas are advisable,
as a temporary measure, is a question I will not address here.
Rather, this is an illustration of how baseline assumptions can
change our experience of phenomena. It is similar to Marilyn
Frye's article about inviting heterosexuals to experience their het-
erosexuality as a conscious choice instead of the assumed orienta-
tion,19 1 or Flagg's attempt to get whites to identify their norms as
who obtain such jobs are still widely viewed as interlopers, depriving white men of
positions or promotions to which they are historically entitled." Id. at 25.
190. See Linz Audain, Critical Cultural Law & Econmics, the Culture of Dein-
dividualization, the Paradox of Blackness, 70 IND. L.J. 709, 729, 731 (1995). She
writes:
mo assert the very idea of race itself, is racist. This is because once the
possibility of a construct of race arises, the formation of beliefs with re-
spect to that construct is inevitable ....
... To use race to fight racism is to validate the proposition that psycho-
logical traits can be successfully associated with this mythical and arbi-
trary construct of race ..... By perpetuating an idea of race, and in par-
ticular the black race, we are unwitting accomplices in perpetuating the
existence of the very evil we seek to destroy. This is the paradox of black-
ness[] ....
Id. at 129-131.
191. See Marilyn Frye, A Lesbian Perspective on Women's Studies, in LESBIAN
STUDIES 194, 196-97 (Margaret Cruikshank ed., 1982).
1998] 523
Law and Inequality
explicitly white, 192 or powell's attempt to get the salad dressing of-
fered in opposition to vegetarian dressing as "meateater's dress-
ing," not "regular."'193 These are all efforts to release reality from
Cartesian cubes, and these efforts are resisted because people fear
that the "the wild profusion of existing things,"'194 once liberated,
will engulf them. 195 This is particularly so when the language
grid, the conceptual dichotomies, the transparencies favor the
groups in power, as, a fortiori, they must.
D. Circular Stereotypes: Miller v. Christopher 196
The Supreme Court heard another "transparency" case in the
1997 term: Miller v. Christopher. Although gender transparency
(regarding male norms) has been the subject of much attention
ever since Reed v. Reed, 197 the first case in which the Court explic-
itly held a statute was unconstitutional because it discriminated
between individuals on the basis of gender, parenting is an area in
which gender-linked role imposition is particularly intransigent.
To the traditionalist, anatomy is destiny, 198 and women, because
they may give birth and may breastfeed, are automatically ren-
dered superior parents, outdistancing fathers in their bond to their
children.199
Although most of us can readily think of exceptions to this in-
ference (birth and breastfeeding makes one the better parent), this
stereotype has been frozen into the rule of law, hearkening back to
a time when women, sans birth control, had no choice whether to
become parents-hence they had better be the experts since they
were biologically locked into decades of childbearing.200 The con-
struction of the subject/object dichotomy of
male/breadwinner/outside world in opposition to fe-
male/motherhood/home took hold as a result of the industrial
revolution.20' We are living with vestiges of it still.
192. See supra notes 128-129 and accompanying text.
193. Grillo, supra note 5, at 20 (recounting powell's experience).
194. FOUCAULT, supra note 17, at xv.
195. See supra note 17-19 and accompanying text (exploring Foucault's critique
of the contingency of linguistic categories).
196. 96 F.3d 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1551 (1997), and
cert. limited by 117 S. Ct. 1689 (1997).
197. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
198. See SIGMUND FREUD, The Passing of the Oedipus Complex, in 2 COLLECTED
PAPERS 269, 274 (1924).
199. See, e.g., Miller, 96 F.3d at 1472.
200. See Elizabeth A. Reilly, The Rhetoric of Disrespect: Uncovering the Faulty
Premises Infecting Reproductive Rights, 5 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 147, 151 (1996).
201. See id.
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One such vestige surfaced in Miller v. Christopher, wherein
the D.C. Circuit held that it is a rational presumption that a
mother will have a stronger connection to her child born out of
wedlock than will the father, because a "mother is far less likely to
ignore the child she has carried in her womb than is the natural
father."202 This statement occurred against the backdrop of a case
considering the question whether the distinction in 8 U.S.C. § 1409
between "illegitimate" children of U.S. mothers and "illegitimate"
children of U.S. fathers violates equal protection.
20 3
This equal protection challenge was brought by Lorelyn Pen-
ero Miller, born in the Philippines in 1970, "illegitimate" child of
Luz Penero, a Filipino woman, and Charlie R. Murray, a U.S. citi-
zen who was stationed in the Philippines. 20 4 After she turned
twenty-one, Ms. Miller applied for registration as a U.S. citizen but
was denied because she did not meet the requirements of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1409(a), a provision of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of
1952.205 Ms. Miller obtained a Voluntary Paternity Decree, estab-
lishing that Mr. Miller was her father, and sought judicial review
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas.206 The case was transferred to the United States Court for
the District of Columbia, which dismissed the claim for lack of
standing, whereupon Ms. Miller appealed.2
07
1. The D.C. Circuit Court's Majority Opinion
Leaving aside other issues in the case,208 let us examine the
rationale behind the D.C. Circuit Court's upholding of the gender-
linked language in 8 U.S.C. § 1409. The court relied on the 1977
202. Miller, 96 F.3d at 1472.
203. See id. at 1469.
204. See id. at 1468.
205. See id. Section 1409(a) provides that a child will be deemed a U.S. citizen
if.
(1) a blood relationship between the person and the father is established
by clear and convincing evidence; (2) the father had the nationality of the
United States at the time of the person's birth; (3) the father (unless de-
ceased) has agreed in writing to provide financial support for the person
until the person reaches the age of 18 years; and (4) while the person is
under the age of 18 years-(A) the person is legitimated under the law of
the person's residence or domicile, (B) the father acknowledges paternity
of the person in writing under oath, or (C) the paternity of the person is
established by adjudication of a competent court.
8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (1994).
206. See Miller, 96 F.3d at 1468-69.
207. See id. at 1469.
208. One could, for example, readily deconstruct the "illegitimate/legitimate"
child dichotomy. In the interest of brevity, I will not do so here.
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Supreme Court case of Fiallo v. Bell 209 as dispositive, quoting its
description of Congress' special concern with the mother/illegit-
imate child relationship as opposed to the father/illegitimate child
relationship and its directive that "it [was] not the judicial role in
cases of this sort to probe and test the justifications for the legisla-
tive decision."210 Further, despite explicitly highlighting the fact
that DNA technology has now removed many obstacles to proof of
paternity which might have justified differential treatment twenty
years ago, the D.C. Circuit found "it entirely reasonable for Con-
gress to require special evidence of such ties between an illegiti-
mate child and its father."21' The Court continued, "[The putative
father [of an illegitimate child] often goes his way unconscious of
the birth of the child. Even if conscious, he is very often totally
unconcerned because of the absence of any ties to the mother. 212
The D.C. Circuit closed by declining to address the argument
that was made both in 1977 and in 1997-that the statute was
"based on an overbroad and outdated stereotype concerning the
relationship of unwed fathers and their illegitimate children,"213
suggesting that such an argument should be directed to the legis-
lature rather than the judiciary.2' 4
2. The Concurrence
Circuit Judge Patricia Wald reluctantly concurred, basing her
decision not on the merits of the majority's stance but on what she
saw as the inexorable command of stare decisis.215 She took strong
issue with the majority's presumption of closer ties between a
mother and illegitimate child than between such a child and her
father. Judge Wald agreed that
traditionally mothers more frequently have assumed primary
responsibility for illegitimate children, although it is a subject
of some debate whether this phenomenon is traceable as much
to socialization and sexism as to biological necessity. But
there is a world of difference between noting that men and
women often fill different roles in society and using these dif-
ferent roles as the justification for imposing inflexible legal
restrictions on one sex and not the other. 216
209. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
210. Miller, 96 F.3d at 1472 (quoting Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 799).
211. Id.
212. Id. (quoting Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 355 (1979)).
213. Miller, 96 F.3d at 1472 (quoting Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 799 n.9).
214. See id.
215. See id. at 1477 (Wald, J., concurring).
216. Id. at 1475.
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Criticizing the notion that mother/child ties should be privi-
leged over father/child ties as discriminatory and based on archaic
stereotypes, 217 Judge Wald characterized Fiallo's instruction that
such concerns should be addressed to Congress as showing
"somewhat cavalier disdain."218 She closed her concurrence by as-
serting that because Fiallo is Supreme Court precedent directly on
point, she had no choice but to follow it.219 However, she added
that it is a "precedent whose time has come and gone; it should be
changed by Congress or the Supreme Court."
220
3. Reflections on Miller
What is happening here? The majority entrenched the bifur-
cation of the descriptive and the normative by privileging the Is
and subjugating the Ought. Evincing a prerationalist faith in tra-
dition, it held that what is happening (or, more accurately, what
used to happen) is a reason for it to continue to happen. Because
mothers used to be or, arguably, still are the "primary parent,"
they should therefore continue to be so, and courts should define
legal rights and entitlements accordingly. Around the circle we go,
privileging the status quo, empowering the empowered, and con-
tributing to the devolution rather than the evolution of legal doc-
trine.
Circular reasoning is one of the paramount moves of a juris-
prudence that rests on transparent, uncontestable baselines. No
neutral, logically compelled rules of law are in operation here. In-
stead, once again, the subject/object categories are constructed:
the external, objective, most visible manifestations of parenting
(breastfeeding, pregnancy, delivery-functions that can only be
performed by women) are deemed paradigmatic and thus privi-
leged over the more subjective aspects of the job (less visible func-
tions that implicate psychological and emotional concerns-
performed equally well by men and women).
Using Schlag's taxonomy,221 we can easily identify the major-
ity as engaging in prerationalist and rationalist cognitive moves,
and the concurrence reads like a rationalist doing a modernist cri-
217. See id. Judge Wald cited a line of U.S. Supreme Court cases that refused
to accept discriminatory classifications based on archaic stereotypes. See id.
(citing J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel., 511 U.S. 127 (1994); Mississippi Univ. for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979)).
218. Miller, 96 F.3d at 1476-77.
219. See id. at 1477.
220. Id.
221 See supra Part II.C.1 (explaining Schlag's taxonomy).
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tique. Dissonance in Judge Wald's concurrence occurs when, de-
spite her trenchant presentation of the shortcomings of the major-
ity's reasoning, she is relegated to signaling fiercely to the Su-
preme Court that they should do what she ostensibly cannot.222
Will they take her up on it? After United States v. Vir-
ginia,223 the chances are better that they will. After approximately
twenty-five years of feminist jurisprudence, driven in large part by
now-Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,224 it is easier
for us to see male norms as visible and contingent than it is for us
to identify still-transparent white norms. Parenting is one of the
last traditionalist hold-outs; the "maternal instinct" as a cultural
directive has had great resilience. The lesson from Miller is that
when one identifies an argument stating that what has been is the
reason why something should be, it is time to get suspicious and
start looking for the transparency. The invisible will manifest, like
the image on a developing photograph, if we begin by focusing on
what is visible and then think about what is missing. It is in this
way that we stalk the wild lacuna.
IV. Another Vision
A. Normativity: Moral Imperative or Rationalist
Imperialism?
As I was formulating ideas for this Article, I was walking
down an urban street, dodging traffic, and discussing my thesis
with an old friend. Towards the end of our conversation, he ex-
claimed, "Just be sure you tell people what to do about it!" Ideas
were there, and accordingly, normativity was not so very far be-
hind.
Normativity has taken some knocks of late. Campos has
criticized it as "relentlessly reductive ... inherently unbelievable .
. . [and] boring. 225 He questions "the normative mania that grips
legal scholarship" and recommends "engag[ing] in a wholehearted
search for the infinitely textured truth, rather than surrendering
to those professional incentives that demand we produce an unreal
brand of advocacy festooned with pretentious footnotes. Some-
222. See Miller, 96 F.3d at 1477.
223. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (holding that the males-only admission rule of Vir-
ginia Military Institute was violative of equal protection).
224. See Deborah L. Markowitz, In Pursuit of Equality: One Woman's Work to
Change the Law, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 335 (1992) (discussing Ruth Bader
Ginsburg's contributions to feminist jurisprudence).
225. Campos, supra note 105, at 1094-95.
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times, as Gertrude Stein reminded us, to question our questions
may be the beginning of wisdom. 22 6
What shall we do; what do you propose; what's the solution,
the plan of attack? These are questions that dominate the dis-
course; indeed, it is extraordinarily uncomfortable, if not impossi-
ble, to write an article without addressing them. Schlag has ac-
cused normative prescription of reducing "world views, attitudes,
demonstrations, provocations, and thought itself, to norms," 227 of
assuming that the author and reader are somehow outside the is-
sue being discussed, neutral observers, not organic, effect-
producing participants in the inquiry. 228 Normativity has no sense
of quantum mechanics.
And yet even Schlag, so critical of normativity in the legal
academy when it surfaces as part (or the raison d'etre) of theory,
cannot restrain himself from validating normativity on an individ-
ual level in the judiciary. In discussing constitutional interpreta-
tion, he writes:
The question of what interpretation to follow in constitutional
law is answered in a series of ungrounded and non-rational
moments of moral or political or aesthetic commitment. The
moments are framed within often well-elaborated jurispru-
dential frameworks. The frameworks are themselves selected
in ungrounded, non-rational moments of commitment ...
[T]here is never any answer to a question of constitutional in-
terpretation other than to do the right thing.229
Prescribing that a judge "do the right thing" is as normative
as it gets-but on a micro level. It is a postmodernist vision of
judging-the judge should obey his own moral, political or aes-
thetic compass rather than an "objective, neutral rule of law." But
the should betrays the inescapably normative nature of the vision;
only the scope of the prescription differs.
We have seen that critical white studies does not shrink from
normative recommendations, nor does critical race theory.230 Even
critical legal studies, in propagating its indeterminacy thesis, at
least implicitly recommends that we all relinquish the idea that
the "neutral rule of law" is anything more than a thinly disguised
discourse of power. Perhaps the best we can do is to embrace a
226. Id. at 1095.
227. Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167, 178
(1990).
228. See id. at 177.
229. Schlag, Authorizing Interpretation, supra note 96, at 1090 (emphasis
added).
230. See supra notes 127-129 and accompanying text.
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postmodernist norm that validates a full recounting of the tex-
tured and variegated experiences of individuals. The goal would
be to amputate as little of others' reality as possible in constructing
our own.
Martha Minow has compiled a list of unstated assumptions
that hinder us from attaining this happy condition; most of these
are snapshots of our prior discussion:
First, we often assume that "differences" are intrinsic,
rather than viewing them as expressions of comparisons be-
tween people. We are all different from one another in innu-
merable ways. Each of these differences is an implicit com-
parison we draw. And the comparisons themselves depend
upon and reconfirm socially constructed meanings about what
traits should matter for purposes of comparison.
Second, typically we adopt an unstated point of reference
when assessing others. From the point of reference of this
norm, we determine who is different and who is normal....
The unstated point of comparison is not neutral, but particu-
lar, and not inevitable, but only seemingly so when left un-
stated ....
Third, we treat the perspective of the person doing the see-
ing or judging as objective, rather than as subjective. Al-
though a person's perspective does not collapse into his or her
demographic characteristics, no one is free from perspective,
and no one can see fully from another's point of view.
Fourth, we assume that the perspectives of those being
judged are either irrelevant or are already taken into account
through the perspective of the judge. That is, we regard a
person's self-conception or world view as unimportant to our
treatment of that person.
Finally, there is an assumption that the existing social and
economic arrangements are natural and neutral. We presume
that individuals are free to form their own preferences and act
upon them. In this view, any departure from the status quo
risks non-neutrality and interference with free choice. 231
To relinquish these assumptions is to embrace a reality that
is infinitely more complex and nuanced than could ever be dreamt
of in a rationalist philosophy. 232 But one person's nuanced com-
plexity is another person's Cartesian Anxiety--"the position that
either there is objective truth or anything goes." 23 3 Fear of the
"wild profusion of existing things" 234 dies hard.
231. Martha Minow, Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REV. 10, 32-33 (1987).
232. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc.5.
233. Schlag, Missing Pieces, supra note 8, at 1205 n.51; see RICHARD J.
BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND
PRAxIS 16-20 (1983).
234. FOUCAULT, supra note 17, at xv; see supra Part II.B.
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The point is that we should (whoops, another normative rec-
ommendation) embrace the tension that exists between those who
declare that normativity strangles theoretical discourse and the
reality that normative judgments are an intrinsic part of how our
species functions. We need not construct an either/or dichotomy;
for instance, we can assert that normativity itself may be inescap-
able, but that some versions may be less noxious than others. Or
that it may be more useful in some contexts than in others. In-
deed, when faced with some atrocities, it may be immoral to re-
frain from making normative prescriptions.
In making any of these assertions, we are once again privi-
leging ego-centered reason (in adjudicating which forms or con-
texts are more appropriate), but to do otherwise is to engage in the
fiction that one can get through a day merely describing phenom-
ena. If that were the case, we would spend the day standing in
front of the closet describing its contents rather than, as we do
each morning, making a normative judgment about what we
should wear to a given occasion and moving on. It is good exercise
to try to do without normativity; it opens one up to diverse descrip-
tions of reality and discourages premature analytical streamlin-
ing.235 But complete abstention seems impossible.
B. Postimodernist Judging: Embracing Complexity
So I shall indulge in some forbidden normative prescriptions.
Some of these may seem farfetched, but my point is to suggest new
paradigms of judging. What would it mean to collapse the sub-
ject/object distinction as a judge? What would such an opinion
look like? Can we imagine it? It is all well and good for academics
to debate about such a project, but in the courtroom, where con-
crete decisions affect real people, can this project be lived out? Is it
possible for a judge to release a postmodernist opinion,23 6 or any
opinion that does not conform to the rationalist prototype?
235. That is, slicing and dicing phenomena to fit into one's hypothesis.
236. Levinson contends that Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-35 (1952), is one such opinion. See San-
ford Levinson, The Rhetoric of the Judicial Opinion, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE
AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 187, 202 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gerwitz eds., 1996)
[hereinafter LAW'S STORIES]. Jackson's concurrence begins:
While an interval of detached reflection may temper teachings of [ expe-
rience, they probably are a more realistic influence on my views than the
conventional materials of judicial decision which seem unduly to accentu-
ate doctrine and legal fiction .... A judge . . . may be surprised at the
poverty of really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete
problems . . . as they actually present themselves. Just what our forefa-
thers did envision, or would have envisioned had they foreseen modern
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The problem is this: we are aware that dissonance exists be-
tween what judges say and what they do. They may make deci-
sions on modernist or postmodernist bases, but their opinions are
replete with prerationalist or rationalist parlance (such as "it is
well settled that..." or "we are compelled to decide that.. .").237
As Schlag says:
[Iun one sense, this can seem very amusing: law apparently is
one field in which twentieth century thought can routinely en-
counter the thought of the eighteenth and lose ... frequently.
But in another sense, this is not amusing at all.. . eighteenth
century conceptions-conceptions of responsibility, of agency,
of harm, of language and meaning itself ... continue to rule
the decisions of a late twentieth century technological society.
Such a state of affairs is at once an intellectual embarrass-
ment and a form of violence. 238
Although the legal academy has been wrestling with such
questions, the judiciary itself does not appear to be concerned. In-
deed, it is becoming evident that most judges, whether for lack of
time or interest, are not listening to legal academics, that the
"judge who conscientiously reads relevant academic literature is
an aberration."239 Such a state of affairs entrenches the hegemony
of rationalism in judicial opinions.
A number of suggestions have been made that would enable
judges to move towards honoring multiple perspectives and es-
caping the tyranny of categorization and transparency. Opportu-
nities to do so are not lacking, as demonstrated by the advent of
Taxman and Miller before the Supreme Court this Term.240 Fol-
lowing Flagg's lead, we can ask that judges "work to make explicit
the unacknowledged whiteness of facially neutral criteria of deci-
sion and ... adopt strategies that counteract the influence of un-
recognized white norms."241 This project can be adapted to target
materials, must be divined from conditions almost as enigmatic as the
dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh. A century and a
half of partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields no net result but
only supplies more or less apt quotations from respected sources on each
side of any question. They largely cancel each other. And court decisions
are indecisive because of the judicial practice of dealing with the largest
question in the most narrow way.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. at 634-35 (Jackson, J., concurring). This ac-
count seems more modernist than postmodernist; it lists the inadequacies of the
sources for a "neutral" rule of law but nowhere displaces the individual judge as
the locus of ego-centered adjudication.
237. See Thomas Morawetz, Law's Essence: Lawyers as Tellers of Tales, 29
CONN. L. REV. 899, 916 (1997) (reviewing LAW'S STORIES, supra note 236).
238. Schlag, Missing Pieces, supra note 8, at 1248.
239. Pierre Schlag, Writing for Judges, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 419, 421 (1992).
240. See supra notes 151-220 and accompanying text.
241. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See," supra note 9, at 957.
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transparent rules of law that offend gender neutrality (and to vali-
date the experience of members in other protected categories as
well).
In essence, a postmodernist judge should make it difficult for
the rule of law to ignore the real lives of the disempowered. 242
Judge Wald, in her concurrence in Miller,243 did so by highlighting
the dissonance between the twenty-year-old precedent invoked by
the majority and the ideals of gender equality driving current ju-
risprudence. Although she encased her decision in classic ration-
alist form, it is hard to envision a judicial opinion that would not
place its author securely in the role of individual adjudicator, the
ultimate arbiter of reality. Such a role is the indispensable predi-
cate upon which the authority of the judiciary rests. How unset-
tling it would be to encounter an opinion such as that drafted by
Jeremy Paul, who was invited to pose as a judge and write a
"critical legal studies" opinion for a law review article. After list-
ing a counterrule for every rule invoked, Paul writes:
I have no story to persuade the affected parties that they
should listen to me because I am merely following the law. I
acknowledge that being a judge often requires me to make up
the law as I go along and that there is nothing I can do about
this .... I take no refuge in any of the more familiar attempts
to justify my vote in the face of my inability to defend it by
reference to universal principles. ... I vote then to reverse the
convictions. You may still ask why, and I answer that, alas,
there is no more for me to say .... You may disagree and of-
fer your own reasons in support of a different outcome. Fate
has it, however, that I am the judge. 244
And even this account, like Justice Jackson's Youngstown
concurrence, 245 does not challenge the institutional role of the
judge as the final, individual arbiter of the dispute. I find myself
unable to envision what an opinion that so dethroned the judge
would look like. "This is my opinion. Now, the text is liberated, so
feel free to read it any way you like." Maybe my imagination has
been irrevocably degraded by the rationalist hegemony in legal
discourse, but this barrier seems impenetrable. (Is it?)
One strategy to expand the cognitive vocabulary of the judici-
ary would be to transform it into a truly diverse body. I am talk-
ing about obtaining adequate representation of individuals from
242. See Grilo, supra note 5, at 28.
243. See supra notes 215-220 and accompanying text.
244. Jeremy Paul, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Contemporary Pro-
ceedings, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1754, 1806-07 (1993).




all protected categories (race, gender, physically challenged, relig-
ion, age, and so on), and I am also talking about a paradigm shift
in the notion of what makes a good judge. Today's judicial ap-
pointees must be unsullied in any way with real life, or they can
expect a rough time with Congress. We want our judges pure,
fast-tracked through private schools, ivy league colleges and law
schools. 246
While many judges of this ilk are unquestionably well suited
to the task, I wonder about those we are excluding. People who
have made mistakes, who have overcome personal difficulties, who
have learned powerful lessons that might allow them to empathize
more with the parties before them are per se excluded by our de-
mand for immaculate curriculum vitae. I am not suggesting any
new, less rigorous, bright line rules for selecting judges; I am sug-
gesting that breadth of experience is a valuable attribute, and may
counteract-in fact may be attainable only as a result of-lessons
learned earlier in one's life. Diversity of experience is what should
be sought. If current conduct (say, within the last eight to ten
years) is beyond reproach, perhaps anything occurring before that
should be subject to a balancing test rather than a (de facto) bright
line rule of exclusion.
Some say transformation of the judiciary is impeded by a pre-
rationalist worship of stare decisis for its own sake, privileging the
past. This so burdens the law's evolution that, as Schlag has
noted, the language and concepts of judicial opinions sometimes
lag entire centuries behind the times. 247 This has led some theo-
rists to suggest that "judges should do and should make whatever
decisions seem to them best for the community's future, not
counting any form of consistency with the past as valuable for its
own sake."248 While such judges might find the past useful as a
guide or as fuel for rhetoric, they should not regard continuity with
the past as an obligation that trumps all other concerns. 249
Instead, postmodernist judges should engage in reflection,
246. The Republicans' recent blockade of federal judicial appointments has
rested on rhetoric decrying judicial activism, and has provoked criticism even from
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist. See Clinton to Nominate 10 Judges Next
Week; Reno Urges Congress to Act, WASH. PoST, Jan. 23, 1998, at A25. Such rheto-
ric may mask desires that federal judges conform to a particular political party's
agenda-desires that, if realized, would defeat the project of creating a diverse ju-
diciary.
247. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
248. Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 413 (1990)
(quoting Dworkin's description of pragmatism with favor) (emphasis added).
249. See id. at 413-14.
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"imagining what life would be like were one to decide one way
rather than another, and [should] engag[e] in discussions with
people whose opinions one values." 250 In order to insure that the
full complexity of the contexts before them are considered, judges
should engage in balancing tests that utilize multiple variables
rather than apply bright-line rules that may dispose of a case by
imposing inflexible categories or by reifying transparent baseline
assumptions.2 51 Staying alert for institutional bias,2 52 a judge pur-
suing a postmodernist project needs a "willingness to expose
[herself] to unfamiliar and unsettling life-forms and experi-
ences" 253 in order to sympathize with the parties before her, or-in
a macro context-to sympathize with the populations that will be
affected by her decision. Only through exposure to views of the
world that are foreign to her can she come to the realization that,
for a lifetime, perhaps she has been seeing only in shades of
blue. 254
C. Quantum Judging: Transcending the Subject/Object
Distinction
Can we go further? The subject/object distinction is still in
play. The judge is still individually and firmly in charge. She may
sympathize, but sympathy implicates her separateness from the
parties before her, her detached, objective position. Can we get
her to empathize rather than sympathize? How far into the reali-
ties of the parties (or affected population) may she journey?
We are doing a "possible world" thing here once again, just
for fun. 255 Assuming the judge cannot do a Vulcan mind meld,256
250. John Hasnas, Back to the Future: From Critical Legal Studies Forward to
Legal Realism, or How Not to Miss the Point of the Indeterminacy Argument, 45
DUKE L.J. 84, 111 (1995).
251. This is not to say that Cartesian tyranny and transparencies cannot inter-
fere with postmodernist adjudication when balancing tests are used. See Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685, 1777 (1976).
252. For example, challenging the disparity in the Sentencing Guidelines for
those found guilty of possession of crack (primarily people of color) and possession
of cocaine (primarily whites). See generally Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No
Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 1111, 1139-40 (1997) ("The sentencing guidelines' discrepant treatment of
crack and powder cocaine had a predictably disproportionate racial impact.").
253. FRED R. DALLMAYR, TWILIGHT OF SUBJECTIVITY: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A POST-
INDIVIDUALIST THEORY OF POLITICS 289 (1981).
254. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
256. A useful and much coveted tool of Mr. Spock in Star Trek. For non-
Trekkies: Spock would place his hand on the other person's forehead, close his
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cannot engage in astral projection, 257 what would it mean for her
to transcend the subject/object distinction, to feel where the parties
are rather than just sympathize with them? Such a judge might
say to herself, "I cannot cloak myself in a neutral rule of law. I am
an integral part of the reality of the parties before me and of the
people my decision will affect. I will be changing their reality no
matter what I decide, or even if I choose not to decide (e.g., deny
certiorari, abstain, etc.)." In a quantum sense, our realities are
one reality, inextricably intertwined. This is quantum judging,
seeing oneself as part of Nature rather than at the helm, knowing
that one's mere presence has always already inexorably altered
the reality that one shares with pertinent populations.
According to Schlag, one then seeks to "do the right thing."258
Alluding to his taxonomy, he writes that "[o]nce the end of the
progression is reached, the last cognitive orientation, postmodern-
ism, sends you back to all the others."259 But "[g]iven that signifi-
cant segments of the legal community remain entrenched in some
of the earlier cognitive orientations, it is often not possible to
communicate from the end of the progression."260 But let us try.
Instead of sending us back to previous stages, are we not
somewhere new? New, at least, to Westerners. Zen Buddhism, for
example, teaches that the individual has two selves: the lesser self
(the ego, limited to the individual, burdened with the conscious-
ness of separateness), and the greater self (encompassing the en-
tire universe, including all beings and all creation).261 The lower
self must be transcended so that one can awaken to one's unity
with all beings and with nature. 262 This sounds suspiciously like
transcending the subject/object dichotomy. 263 Zen Buddhists train
eyes, and use his special Vulcan powers so that their minds would meld.
257. Defined, by a skeptic, as "It]he separation of a person's consciousness from
his or her body, allowing the person to travel short or vast distances without tak-
ing the body along." Robert T. Carroll, Ph.D., The Skeptic's Dictionary (visited
Jan. 31, 1998) <http://wheel.ucdavis.edu/%7Ebtcarrol/skeptic/astralpr.html>.
258. Schlag, Authorizing Interpretation, supra note 96, at 1090.
259. Schlag, Missing Pieces, supra note 8, at 1249 n.201.
260. Id. at 1250 n.201.
261. See ROBERT FRAGER & JAMES FADIMAN, PERSONALITY AND PERSONAL
GROWTH 466-67 (2d ed. 1984).
262. See id. at 467.
263. Indeed, "the world view inherent in Hinduism, Buddhism, and Taoism...
sees through the 'rigid self ... and replaces the sense of isolation with a sense of
connectedness. It is no longer 'I' against 'you' or 'it.' It is 'we' in a play of relation
and interaction."' Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization, International Institutions, and
the Erosion of National Sovereignty and Democracy, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1944, 1957
(1997) (quoting ROBERT A.F. THURMAN, TIBET: ITS BUDDHISM AND ITS ART 24
(1991) and reviewing THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INSTITUTIONS (1995)).
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to transcend ego orientation but do not seek to eliminate the lesser
self. Zen Buddhism embraces both the real and the ideal, recog-
nizing the tension between the two, yet viewing training as en-
lightenment rather than envisioning enlightenment as an unat-
tainable goal.264
Others have explored the relevance of Buddhist thought to
legal theory.265 Like them, I am not an advocate for Buddhism,
but I find its treatment of the subject/object distinction intriguing.
Postmodernism does, in fact, send us back to all the other cognitive
frameworks, as Schlag claims, because in order to comprehend this
quantum, quasi-Buddhist notion of judging, we must engage in
some prerationalism-unquestioning faith in the existence of the
jurisprudential equivalent of lesser and greater selves, and in the
possibility of crudely applying the principles of quantum mechan-
ics to judging. We have, indeed, come full circle.
But is this quantum/quasi-Buddhist judge a gunman writ
large?266 If she abandons the rule of law entirely in favor of tran-
scendence, what happens to consistency in decision making?
When confronted with the constructed opposition of consistency
versus empathy, the answer, as always, is to understand that the
two values are in tension but should both be honored-that they
should exist in a relationship of differance.267 As a judge decides
264. See FRAGER & FADIMAN, supra note 261, at 466-69.
265. See, e.g., REBECCA REDWOOD FRENCH, THE GOLDEN YOKE: THE LEGAL
COSMOLOGY OF BUDDHIST TIBET (1995) (examining Tibetan "legal cosmology");
powell, supra note 5, at 1505-08 (discussing Buddhist perspective on issues of iden-
tity).
266. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 108, at 7. Others have asserted a relationship
between quantum mechanics and Buddhism, to wit:
All that exists by itself is an unbroken wholeness that presents itself to us
as webs (more patterns) of relations. Individual entities are idealizations,
which are correlations made by us .... [Tihe physical world, according to
quantum mechanics is "... not a structure built out of independently ex-
isting unanalyzable entities, but rather a web of relationships between
elements whose meanings arise wholly from their relationships to the
whole." The new physics sounds very much like old eastern mysticism.
Trimble, supra note 263, at 1956-57 (quoting GARY ZUKAv, THE DANCING WU LI
MASTERS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE NEW PHYSICS 72 (Bantam ed. 1988) and HENRY
STAPP, S-MATRIX INTERPRETATION OF QUANTUM THEORY (Lawrence Berkely Labo-
ratory preprint 1970, revised version reprinted in 3 PHYSICAL REVIEW D 1303
(1971))) (alteration in original). Not surprisingly, this relationship has not been
enthusiastically embraced by the scientific community. See ROBERT P. CREASE &
CHARLES C. MANN, THE SECOND CREATION: MAKERS OF THE REVOLUTION IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY PHYSICS 67 (1986).
267. See JACQUES DERRIDA, SPEECH AND PHENOMENA 129-60 (1973); Deconstruc-
tive Practice, supra note 27, at 751-52 (citing JACQUES DERRIDA, MARGINS OF
PHILOSOPHY 3 (1982)). Buddhism addresses this tension by instructing that the
rule of law is "a product of troubled times and should be tolerated rather than ad-
mired," and that rules should be obeyed until one is "enlightened enough to do the
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the case before her and feels compelled, due to empathy, to com-
promise consistency and amend the rule of law, she should be sure
to give specific reasons why she is doing so. The very requirement
of giving reasons will constrain untethered inconsistency to some
extent; preservation of judicial capital will check extreme decision
making, as it does today. 268 Like the realists, I may be slipping
into the "judge as noble savage" fiction.2 69 But if we have given the
judge the singular power to adjudicate, and thus transcend the
subject/object distinction, must we not also place the burden of this
vision on her shoulders?
IV. Conclusion
Clearly, we could not get much more abstract. Perhaps, like
Buddhists, we can strive for the ideal of transcendence while
working in the material world. Perhaps, like quantum theorists,
we can embrace the notion that we exist in Nature, one of many,
that we cannot absent ourselves from our presence in the world.
Perhaps we can believe in the contingent nature of our language,
our assignment of meaning, our cognitive frameworks, our theories
of self. We can work to expose ourselves to as many perspectives
as possible so that our experience of the world, as judges, as aca-
demics, as readers of texts will not be tragically parochial, unicol-
ored, filled with transparent assumptions. We can resist Carte-
sian Anxiety and suspect categories wherever we find them. We
can track our normative impulses and try to prevent them from
strangling inquiry. (If this paragraph gets much more normative,
we'd have to wonder.)
Turning, therefore, to the purely descriptive, I recount the
right thing instinctively." Andrew Huxley, Golden Yoke, Silken Texts, 106 YALE
L.J. 1885, 1910 (1997) (reviewing FRENCH, supra note 265, and R.P. PEERENBOOM,
LAW AND MORALITY IN ANCIENT CHINA: THE SILK MANUSCRIPTS OF HUANG-LAo
(1993)). Application of the rule of law is far from rigid, since rules "merely give a
first approximation to the truth," and "true wisdom comes from recognizing when
among the infinite variety of situations the rule should be abandoned." Id. at
1910-11 (quoting Steven Collins, The Lion's Roar on the Wheel-Turning King: A
Response to Andrew Huxley's The Buddha and the Social Contract, 24 J. INDIAN
PHIL. 421, 431 (1996)). I do not assert that these ideas are realizable in Western
culture. Using balancing tests that validate both consistency and empathy may be
the best we can do.
268. See Kennedy, supra note 108, at 527-30.
269. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. Note that I am not making the
prerationalist or rationalist assertion that invocations of plain language, legisla-
tive intent, or precedent should constrain extreme decision making; rather, the
reasons I request resonate with those requested by the realists-those responsive
to the sociolegal context surrounding the case. See supra note 109 and accompa-
nying text.
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STALKING THE WILD LACUNA
last two lines of a recently discovered poem, 2 7 0 which I believe sum
up not only the quandary facing the reader of texts, but also that
facing the child learning her mother tongue, the theorist taming
the profusion of events, the judge seeking reasons for her decision:
But take care. Traps are here. Words mean.
I mean. You, reading, want 271
The stalking done, we face the lacuna in its wild and
primitive state, and discover this:
It is in the wanting that interpretation, life, and the
law begin.
270. The document was either a poem or a will. See Grey, supra note 69, at 216.
271. Id.
1998]

